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UNIFORMITY OR DIVERSITY:
RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE
FINANCE LAW IN THE 1990s
AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF
CHANGING FINANCIAL MARKETS
MICHAEL H. SCHiLL*
The financing of residential real estate transactions has changed dra-
matically over the past two decades.' Real estate credit markets, once
locally segmented, have been integrated into national and international
capital markets. The integration of capital markets has been achieved as
a result of several factors, including the deregulation of financial institu-
tions, the growth of the secondary mortgage market, the development of
securitization, and the application of technological advances in informa-
tion processing.
In light of this "revolution in real estate finance,"2 today the central
legal issue concerning real estate transactions is how the law should
adapt to the new market realities. Many legislators and commentators
have proposed that the current system of diverse state real estate finance
laws be replaced with uniform law, either voluntarily adopted by states
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1980, Princeton University;
J.D. 1984, Yale University.
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Robert Kaplan and financial assistance of the Institute for Law and Economics and the Education
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1. Some of the changes that have transformed residential real estate finance are also changing
the way commercial real estate transactions are financed. See generally Richards, "Gradable and
Tradeable". The Securitization of Commercial Real Estate Mortgages, 16 REAL EsT. L.J. 99 (1987)
(discussing securitization of commercial real estate mortgages).
2. A. DowNs, THE REVOLUTION IN REAL ESTATE FINANCE (1985).
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or imposed by the federal government. Virtually all attempts to have
states voluntarily adopt uniform real estate finance laws have failed,
including, most recently, the Uniform Land Transactions Act.3 Greater
success in achieving uniformity has been realized through federal pre-
emption. During the 1980s, the federal government preempted state laws
regulating usury, due-on-sale clauses, and the foreclosure of mortgage
loans on multi-family dwellings insured by the Federal Housing Admin-
istration. Given the federal government's willingness to preempt state
law, and the states' inability or unwillingness to adopt uniform law, uni-
formity of real estate finance law will most likely only be achieved as a
result of similar federal intervention.
This Article examines the normative case for replacing diverse state
real estate finance laws with a uniform national law. Part I describes the
changes that have occurred over the past twenty years, culminating in
the integration of real estate credit markets with general capital markets.
Part II recounts efforts over the past twenty years to make the laws gov-
erning real estate finance more uniform across the nation.
Part III evaluates whether the arguments typically advanced by pro-
ponents of uniform law and federal preemption justify preemption of
diverse state real estate finance laws. My focus in this part is on mort-
gage foreclosure laws. I conclude that the case for federal preemption of
these state real estate finance laws is quite weak. Economic efficiency
arguments for uniform national mortgage foreclosure law are unpersua-
sive. Spillovers generated by state mortgage foreclosure laws are likely to
be modest and can be eliminated at low cost. Transaction costs and lost
scale economies attributable to these laws are also likely to be small in
magnitude. In fact, at the margin, state laws governing real estate
finance may promote, rather than hinder, the objective of economic effi-
ciency by generating market discipline over the lawmaking process. Uni-
form national law has also been frequently justified on the ground that
meaningful differences among states have ceased to exist.4 However,
despite their increasing interdependence, American states retain distinc-
tive economic, political, demographic, and cultural characteristics.
These differences among states are likely to require varying laws gov-
erning the relationship between mortgagors and mortgagees.
Finally, preferences for uniform national real estate law that are
based on the belief that state legislative processes are unlikely to generate
3. ULTA, 13 U.L.A. 469 (1986). All references to the ULTA are to the 1977 version
reprinted in 13 U.L.A. 469 (1986).
4. See infra notes 186-209 and accompanying text.
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coherent laws seem especially out of place in the 1990s. Over the past
two decades, state legislative capacity has substantially increased as a
result of a series of institutional reforms. Empirical evidence suggests
that contemporary state legislatures are capable of enacting coherent,
innovative real estate finance laws that are responsive to the needs and
desires of their citizens.5
My analysis also suggests that the question of which level of govern-
ment should regulate commercial transactions is exceedingly complex
and cannot be resolved merely by reference to the scope of the markets
involved. The choice between uniform national law and diverse state
laws must take into account the structure of the industry involved, the
economic effects of regulation, and the political forces influencing federal
and state legislative processes. For real estate finance, as well as other
areas of commerce, the development of national markets does not auto-
matically imply that national law is either necessary or desirable.
I. THE REVOLUTION IN RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE
FINANCE: FROM LOCAL TO NATIONAL MARKETS
A. MORTGAGE MARKETS UNDER THE NEW DEAL REGimE
The contours of twentieth-century housing finance were largely
established in the 1930s. Faced with a financial system in ruin, the fed-
eral government created the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system
in 1932 to regulate and restore confidence in the nation's savings and
loan (thrift) institutions.6 To improve the liquidity of these institutions,
thrifts were permitted to borrow funds from Federal Home Loan Banks.
At the same time, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC) was instituted to insure the deposits of savings and loan custom-
ers. As part of their regulatory framework, thrift institutions were lim-
ited in their choice of both liabilities and assets. Thrifts were required to
raise money through short-term time deposits and invest in long-term
home mortgage loans.7 In addition to these restrictions on liabilities and
assets, savings and loan institutions were limited to lending within their
5. See infra notes 210-281 and accompanying text.
6. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, 47 Stat. 725 (1933).
7. See S. COOPER & D. FRASER, THE FINANCIAL MARKETPLACE 232, 292 (3d ed. 1990)
(stating that dominant source of S&L funds is savings accounts and that thrifts have been subject to
portfolio restrictions aimed at concentrating lending to mortgages); Weicher, The Future of the
Housing Finance System, in RESTRUCTURING BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES IN AMERICA 296,
298 (W. Haraf & R. Kushmider eds. 1988) (discussing S&L asset and liability restrictions).
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local markets. Initially, thrifts could lend only within a fifty-mile radius
of their home offices.' Interstate branching was prohibited.'
To induce the thrifts to originate long-term, self-amortizing home
mortgage loans with relatively low down payments, the federal govern-
ment established the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in 1934.
The primary function of FHA is to insure mortgagees against the risk of
borrower default. In addition to shielding thrifts from the risk of default,
the federal government addressed the problem of liquidity by creating a
government-owned agency called the Federal National Mortgage Associ-
ation (FNMA) in 1938. FNMA's mission was to create a secondary
market for the sale and purchase of FHA-insured mortgage loans.10
For the next half century, the institutions and regulatory framework
that were created after the Great Depression continued largely intact.
From the 1930s until the early 1980s the real estate capital market was
separate from general capital markets. The typical home mortgage loan
during this period was originated by a local savings and loan institution
which raised funds from local residents by paying interest on their time
deposits. The thrift usually held the loan in its portfolio until it matured,
the borrower defaulted, or the borrower prepaid the debt.1" Interest
rates and the supply of credit were sensitive to local economic conditions,
8. See Weicher, supra note 7, at 299.
9. See M. LEA, HOUSING AND THE CAPITAL MARKETS 4 (1988).
10. See C. EDSON & B. JACOBS, SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET GUIDE § 5.01, at 5-3
(1990).
11. The description of the typical mortgage financing during this period is, of course, oversim-
plified. Savings and loan institutions were not totally reliant upon local depositors for their invest-
ment capital. Thrifts could borrow funds from Federal Home Loan Banks which, in turn, raised
money in the general capital markets. In addition, thrifts could sell mortgage loans either through
FNMA, if they were federally insured, or by using a mortgage broker. Nevertheless, the description
in the text characterized the bulk of home loan mortgage activity until the growth of the secondary
mortgage market in the 1970s and 1980s.
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as well as national economic trends. 12 Several economists have charac-
terized real estate finance markets during this period as "segmented.'
' 3
B. INTEGRATION OF REAL ESTATE wiT-
GENERAL CAPITAL MAETS
Over the past decade, the segmentation of real estate financial mar-
kets has dissolved. Real estate credit markets have been substantially
linked to general capital markets as a result of numerous factors includ-
ing deregulation, the growth of the secondary mortgage market, securi-
tization, and technological advances.
1. Deregulation of Real Estate Credit Markets
During the late 1960s, savings and loan institutions, the predomi-
nant source of home mortgage credit in the United States, began to expe-
rience financial difficulties. As inflation increased, thrifts had to pay
higher rates to attract time deposits. The industry's profits were
squeezed due to the fact that it had to pay depositors high interest rates
while its income was tied to long-term loans that earned relatively low
rates. 14 In response, the federal government, through a measure known
as "Regulation Q," sought to assist thrifts by placing a ceiling on the
12. Several empirical studies examining interest rate data for this period found that widespread
regional differences existed in interest rates. Typically, interest rates were lowest in capital rich areas
of the country such as the northeast and highest in growing areas such as the west. See L. GREBLER,
D. BLANK & L. WINNICK, CAPrrAL FORMATION IN RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE 221, 229 (1956)
(showing that regional differentials in interest rates remained in 1940, but are less than in 1890);
Fredrikson, The Geographic Structure of Residential Mortgage Yields, in 2 ESSAYS ON INTERESr
RATES 187, 195-96 (J. Guttenberg ed. 1971) (Loans sampled in 1963 support the finding that yields
on conventional mortgage loans are typically lower in the east and midwest than in the south and
west.); Longbrake & Peterson, Regional and Intra-regional Variations in Mortgage Loan Rates, 31 J.
ECON. & Bus. 75, 80 (1979) (using 1971 data to reach the same conclusion as Fredrikson, supra);
Schaaf, Regional Differences in Mortgage Financing Costs, 21 J. FIN. 85, 93 (1966) (A substantial
part of regional variation in interest rates is explained by the distance of the borrower from north-
eastern capital markets.). Recent studies have found that although differences in interest rates
charged in states for home mortgage loans remain, they are smaller and no longer follow regional
patterns. See infra note 57.
13. See B. BOSWORTH, A. CARRON & E. RHYNE, THE ECONOMICS OF FEDERAL CREDIT
PROGRAmS 196 (1987) ("The residential mortgage market has historically been viewed as the princi-
pal example of a segmented market that has limited interaction with other financial markets."); S.
MAISEL, REAL ESTATE FINANCE 229 (1987) (showing that the mortgage market was once purely
local and segmented into submarkets); Hendershott & Van Order, Integration of Mortgage and Capi-
tal Markets and the Accumulation of Residential Capital, 19 REG. Sci. & URn. EcON. 189, 197-98
(1989) (contrasting the segmented mortgage market model with neoclassical perfect markets).
14. See Weicher, supra note 7, at 301 ("Since S&Ls borrowed short and lent long, unantici-
pated inflation drove up the rates they paid on all their deposits, but they could earn more only on
new mortgages.").
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rates that savings and loans and commercial banks could pay deposi-
tors.i" Nevertheless, the condition of thrifts deteriorated as entrepre-
neurs offered alternative investment vehicles such as money market funds
that paid interest at rates above the ceiling permitted by Regulation Q.
In a process called "disintermediation," savings and loan depositors
withdrew their funds from thrifts and invested them in these alternative
instruments. 6
Faced with an ailing thrift industry, in the early 1980s the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board promulgated regulations and Congress enacted
laws to deregulate savings and loan institutions. Savings and loans were
allowed to originate a wide variety of adjustable rate mortgage loans that
would shield the institutions from a portion of the interest rate risk they
bore with fixed rate loans. 7 The Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 198018 phased out Regulation Q deposit
rate ceilings, permitted thrifts to invest in a wide variety of activities
other than housing, and preempted state anti-usury laws for primary res-
idence mortgage loans.19 The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act of 198220 further deregulated the thrift industry by increasing thrifts'
lending powers, preempting state laws that prohibited the enforcement of
due-on-sale clauses, and permitting the acquisition of failing institutions
by thrifts in other states.21
Deregulation of thrift institutions has promoted the integration of
real estate credit markets with national capital markets. The lifting of
Regulation Q allows thrifts to offer depositors competitive interest rates,
thereby tying the supply of home mortgage credit more closely to general
capital markets. The preemption of state anti-usury laws similarly per-
mits mortgage loan interest rates to rise to levels earned on similarly
15. Commercial banks were also subject to deposit rate ceilings that were lower than those
applied to savings and loan institutions. See M. LEA, supra note 9, at 4.
16. See R. POZDENA, THE MODERN ECONOMICS OF HOUSING 161-62 (1988) (discussing dis-
intermediation caused by deposit rate ceilings).
17. See Weicher, supra note 7, at 302.
18. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
19. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464, 1735f-7 (1988). For further discussion of the provisions of the Act
that preempted state anti-usury laws see infra text accompanying notes 115-118.
20. Pub. L. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
21. 12 U.S.C. § 1464, 1701j-3, 1823 (1988). For further discussion of the provisions of the Act
that preempted state laws prohibiting the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 126-27. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, imposes new restrictions upon thrift institution lending and
investment activities.
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risky investments. Although some geographic restrictions on thrift lend-
ing had been phased out over the previous decade, the provisions permit-
ting out-of-state acquisition of failing thrifts chiseled away at yet another
barrier to a national mortgage market.
2. Growth of the Secondary Mortgage Market and Securitization
The size and scope of the secondary mortgage market increased in
the early 1970s and surged dramatically in the 1980s. In 1968 Congress
split FNMA into two entities.22 The low income housing subsidy pro-
grams that had previously been administered by FNMA were taken over
by a newly formed government agency called the Government National
Mortgage Association (GNMA). 23 FNMA was restructured as a private
corporation with ties to the federal government. Although stock in
FNMA is privately owned, FNMA's fifteen-member board of directors
includes five members selected by the President. FNMA also has certain
advantages over financial institutions that are not related to the govern-
ment, such as a line of credit with the United States Treasury and an
exemption from federal securities registration and disclosure require-
ments. Under the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, FNMA was
empowered to buy and sell conventional, as well as federally insured,
mortgage loans.24
In 1970 Congress established a new secondary mortgage market
agency called the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(FHLMC). 2s Like FNMA, FHLMC has ties to the federal government.
The legislation creating FHLMC provided that the three members of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board serve as FHLMC's directors.2 6
FHLMC's mission is to purchase and sell conventional home mortgage
loans.27
22. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 802(c), 82 Stat. 476,
536 (1968) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1716-1723(h) (1988)).
23. 12 U.S.C. § 1716b (1988).
24. Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 201, 84 Stat. 450, 450-51
(1971) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1717 (1988)).
25. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-351, § 301-10, 84 Stat.
451 (1970).
26. As a result of the abolition of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, FHLMC now has 18
directors. The President appoints five directors with the remaining 13 chosen by the shareholders.
See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
§ 731(b), 103 Stat. 183, 430.
27. At the time FHLMC was created, no secondary market entity had the power to buy and
sell conventional mortgage loans. Nevertheless, the same legislation that established FHLMC also
permitted FNMA to purchase non-federally insured mortgage loans. One of the reasons for the
duplication of functions between the two entities is to further competition. In addition, the creation
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FNMA and FHLMC were established to provide liquidity in the
market for residential mortgage loans and to increase the flow of capital
to housing.28 Originating lenders had found that individual mortgage
loans were difficult to sell in the absence of an organized secondary mar-
ket. This illiquidity was primarily due to information limitations. The
underwriting policies of lending institutions varied tremendously as did
the mortgage contracts and loan documents that they used. In addition,
each loan was secured by a unique property located in a particular geo-
graphic area subject to particularized demographic and market condi-
tions. In the absence of uniform standards for originating and
underwriting mortgage loans, as well as a standardized system for buying
and selling these loans, the information costs of individual loan
purchases were prohibitive.
Through their dominant role in the purchase and sale of home mort-
gage loans, FNMA and FHLMC standardized the practice of mortgage
loan origination.29 The agencies prescribe standards for loan documents
and appraisals. They typically require that the loans they purchase carry
a loan-to-value ratio of 80 percent or less. For loans with a higher loan-
to-value ratio, the agencies usually require the purchase of FHA or pri-
vate mortgage insurance.3" In addition, the choice of terms available to
borrowers is largely determined by criteria acceptable to the agencies.
Besides standardizing the practices of the home mortgage lending
industry, FNMA, FHLMC and GNMA have increased the liquidity of
mortgage loans by creating a market for the sale and purchase of the
loans. The agencies issue commitments to purchase loans originated by
thrift institutions, mortgage banks, and other financial intermediaries.
This assurance that mortgage originators will be able to transform their
home loans into cash reduces the interest rate risk of mortgage lending
and stimulates the origination of home loans. 31
of FHLMC was supported by thrift institutions which felt that FNMA was dominated by builders
and mortgage bankers. See S. MAISEL, supra note 13, at 180.
28. See A. DoWNs, supra note 2, at 239-40, S. MAISEL, supra note 13, at 200-01.
29. Standardization was also prompted by FHA requirements that borrowers meet certain
underwriting criteria prior to obtaining federal mortgage insurance.
30. See S. MAISEL, supra note 13, at 214-15 (FNMA and FHLMC may purchase loans with
loan-to-value ratios over eighty percent provided that the loans are insured).
31. When originators sell mortgage loans in the secondary mortgage market, they typically
retain the right to service the loans. Servicing rights are generally considered valuable financial
assets that are themselves traded. See Biasucci & Martell, Buying and Selling Mortgage Servicing, 6
SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKETS 29 (1990). Servicers, in return for a fee, collect loan payments
from borrowers, pay the proceeds to the beneficial owners of the mortgages, pursue delinquent bor-
rowers and bring mortgage foreclosure actions. In some instances, the servicer retains the risk of
loss attributable to mortgage foreclosure in return for a higher servicing fee; in other cases, the risk is
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The purchase and sale of home mortgage loans by FNMA and
FHLMC promotes the geographic integration of real estate capital mar-
kets. Frequently, demand for residential real estate capital is not uni-
form throughout the nation.32 Some areas of the country grow faster
than others and therefore require more credit. The agencies smooth out
interregional differences in supply and demand by purchasing mortgage
loans from rapidly growing regions with a high demand for capital and
selling those loans to investors in regions with low levels of real estate
activity.
The secondary mortgage market agencies also promote the integra-
tion of real estate credit markets with national and international capital
markets.33 The agencies raise funds from the capital markets by issuing
short-term notes and long-term bonds. The agencies use these funds to
purchase mortgage loans for their own portfolios, thereby providing a
conduit linking the bond market with the mortgage market. FNMA's
mortgage portfolio is enormous; it currently holds in excess of one hun-
dred billion dollars worth of residential mortgages,'M making it the single
largest portfolio lender in the country.35
The most important contribution of the secondary mortgage market
agencies to the integration of real estate and general capital markets is
borne by the owner of the mortgage loans or the guarantor of the mortgage-backed security collater-
alized by the mortgage. See E. BALDWIN & B. STOTS, MORTGAGE-BACKED SEcuirrms: A REF-
ERENCE GUIDE FOR LENDERS AND ISSUERS 47-153 (1990) (detailing mortgage-backed security
programs and pricing of servicing fees). Even in those instances where a servicer does not bear
default risk, it stands to lose money if the loans in its portfolio go into default. See id. at 251-52
(Servicer must continue paying principal and interest to holders of mortgage-backed securities after
default; agencies will reimburse this expense, but will not pay interest on advances.); Kaplan, The
Legal and Regulatory Environment for Mortgage Bankers, in MORTGAGE BANKING: A HANDBOOK
OF STRATEGIES, TRENDS AND OPPORTUNrrms 71, 89 (J. Lederman ed. 1989) (FNMA and
FHLMC can bring pressure on the originator or servicer of a loan to repurchase a loan in default.);
Wolcott, Servicing Risks: Managing Uncertainties, MORTGAGE BANKING, June 1989, at 38 (Delin-
quent loans are expensive to service.).
32. See Villani, The Secondary Mortgage Markets, in HOUSING AND THE NEW FINANCIAL
MARS 283, 285 (R. Florida, ed. 1986) (discussing the surplus of housing capital in the North and
shortages in the West and Southwest).
33. See McMahan, The Real Estate Capital Market" Historical Perspectives, Emerging Trends
and Future Directions, REAL ESr. ISSUES, Fall/Winter 1987, at 11, 13 (Real estate capital markets
have become international.).
34. See S. MAISEL, supra note 13, at 182 (FNMA has $100 billion of mortgages in its portfo-
lio.); The US Mortgage Market: A Statistical Overview, 4 HOUSING FIN. INT'L 9 (1989) (FNMA
holds $103 billion of residential mortgage debt or 5% of all outstanding residential mortgage debt.).
35. See Weicher, supra note 7, at 311.
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their promotion of securitization1 6 In 1970, GNMA introduced a pro-
gram that guaranteed the timely payment of interest and principal on
securities collateralized by pools of FHA-insured mortgage loans. In
essence, each purchaser of a GNMA pass-through certificate owns an
undivided interest in each of the FHA-insured mortgages pooled by the
issuer of the security. Security holders are entitled to receive their pro-
portionate shares of the principal and interest payments as they are paid
by borrowers.
Since 1970, a bewildering array of mortgage-backed securities have
been created to appeal to a wide variety of investors. Nevertheless, the
basic design of a mortgage-backed security remains the same. An agency
or private entrepreneur pools hundreds of home mortgage loans and
issues a security that entitles the holder to receive interest and principal
payments. Typically the payments of interest and principal are guaran-
teed by a secondary mortgage market agency or a private institution.17
Several varieties of mortgage-backed securities, such as the collateralized
mortgage obligation, differ from GNMA pass-through certificates in that
the holder of the instrument is not deemed to own an undivided interest
in each of the pooled mortgages. Instead, each security is divided into
several classes or tranches that correspond to the demand of investors for
instruments of varying maturities. Most holders of the security receive
periodic payments of interest. However, principal payments and prepay-
ments are not distributed pro rata to all security holders. Instead, hold-
ers of the first class (short-term interests) are entitled to all principal
payments and prepayments until their investments are paid off. Addi-
tional principal payments and prepayments are then assigned to holders
of longer term interests until all security owners have been repaid their
capital.
Securitization of home mortgage loans has, in a rather short span of
time, substantially advanced integration of real estate and general capital
markets. Together with agency guarantees and private credit enhance-
ment, pooling together mortgage loans of different borrowers and regions
diversifies the mortgage-backed security holder's portfolio, thus lessening
the risk of extending credit to the purchasers of homes. This decreased
36. For a detailed description of the securitization process, see W. BARTLETr, MORTGAGE-
BACKED SEcURTIEs (1989). For analyses of legal issues concerning mortgage-backed securities, see
Murray & Hadaway, Mortgage-Backed Securities An Investigation of Legal and Financial Issues, 11
J. ConP. L. 203 (1986); Pittman, Economic and Regulatory Developments Affecting Mortgage
Related Securities, 64 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 497 (1989).
37. In some instances the securities are overcollateralized, and thereby achieve a level of credit-
worthiness similar to a guarantee.
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risk enlarges the number of potential investors in housing credit.3"
Designing mortgage-backed securities to resemble bonds in terms of their
maturities has also opened the housing credit market to investors who
otherwise would not be interested in investing in long-term, home mort-
gage loans. By linking real estate credit markets with general capital
markets, securitization of mortgages increases the flow of funds into resi-
dential real estate and reduces the interest rates paid by borrowers.39
3. Technological Advances
Technological advances have also promoted the integration of capi-
tal markets. Computers and telecommunications have reduced the
importance of geographic proximity between the lender and borrower.'
Funds and information can be transferred instantaneously across great
distances. Increasingly, electronic networks make interstate lending
more feasible.41 Computer technology has reduced the transaction costs
of evaluating the large number of mortgage loans purchased and sold
each day through the secondary mortgage market.42 Technological inno-
vation has also increased the capacity of specialized firms to expand into
new areas and shift funds from one use to another.43
C. EVIDENCE OF INTEGRATION
The integration of real estate credit markets with general capital
markets has greatly accelerated over the past two decades. Although
among financial institutions thrifts continue to originate the largest share
of home mortgage loans, they no longer hold nearly as large a proportion
of loans in their own portfolios as they once did. In 1970, thrift institu-
tions held 40% of all mortgage loans outstanding; this proportion
declined to 29% in 1988.44 If holdings of mortgage-backed securities are
included, the proportion of residential debt held by savings and loan
institutions fell from 54% in 1980 to 44% in 1988. At the same time, the
38. For example, many institutions such as pension funds tend to shy away from extremely
risky investments because of the fiduciary duty they owe to their beneficiaries. The lower risk of
mortgage-backed securities attracts their capital to the housing market.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 49-57 (reviewing empirical evidence of the effect of the
secondary mortgage market and securitization on interest rates).
40. See S. MAISEL, supra note 13, at 243.
41. See Weicher, supra note 7, at 323.
42. See Haraf & Kushmeider, Redefining Financial Markets, in Rns'RUCTURiNG BANKING &
FINANCIAL SERVICES IN AMERICA, supra note 7, at 1, 3.
43. See A. DowNs, supra note 2, at 45.
44. The US Mortgage Market: A Statistical Overview, supra note 34, at 9.
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share of debt held by pension and retirement funds, typically in the form
of mortgage-backed securities, more than doubled from 2.9% to 6.4%.
Secondary mortgage market activity exploded during this period.
From 1970 to 1984, the proportion of all fixed rate residential mortgage
loans sold through the secondary mortgage market increased from 32%
to 61%. 46 In the early 1980s less than 5% of all newly originated, con-
forming47 conventional fixed rate home mortgage loans were securitized.
This proportion increased to over one-half by 1987.48
Empirical studies confirm the integration of real estate credit mar-
kets with general capital markets. For example, Hendershott and Shil-
ling examined the interest rate differentials between loans conforming to
secondary mortgage market purchase requirements4 9 and loans that did
not conform and therefore could not be traded by FNMA, GNMA or
FHLMC.5  They found that when the size of the loan climbed above the
conforming limit, the interest rate jumped from 15 to 30 basis points.51
This finding supports the proposition that the secondary mortgage mar-
ket agencies reduced home mortgage loan interest rates by tying the real
estate capital market to general credit markets.
Numerous studies have shown that the correlation between home
loan interest rates and the rates offered by other financial instruments
increased dramatically over the past decade. Roth, for example, com-
pared rates for Treasury notes with rates offered by FHLMC mortgage-
backed securities.52 He found that from 1972 through 1981, the correla-
tion between the rates offered by the two instruments was relatively small
45. See Lasko, Housing Finance in the USA in the 1990s, 4 HousiNG FIN. INTL 4, 6 (1989).
46. B. BOSWORTH, A. CARRON & E. RHYN supra note 13, at 70. According to one projec-
tion, by the year 2000, 80% of home loan originations will be sold through the secondary mortgage
market. See Lasko, supra note 45, at 8.
47. FNMA and FHLMC do not purchase home mortgage loans that exceed certain annually
adjusted ceilings. Loans that are below these ceilings are called conforming loans. In 1988, the
ceiling was $168,700. Hendershott & Van Order, supra note 13, at 191.
48. See id. at 192.
49. See supra note 47 for a description of the practice of secondary mortgage market agencies
to purchase only those loans whose size is less than prescribed limits.
50. Hendershott & Shilling, The Impact of the Agencies on Conventional Fixed-Rate Mortgage
Yields, 2 J. REVAL EsT. FIN. & ECON. 101 (1989).
51. Id. at 112. A basis point is equal to 1/100th of a percent interest rate.
52. Roth, Volatile Mortgage Rates: A New Fact of Life?, FED. RZs. BANK OF KANSAS CrTy
EcON. REV., March 1988, at 16.
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and statistically insignificant. From 1981 to 1987, however, the correla-
tion increased to .91 and became statistically significant.53 In 1989 Hen-
dershott and Van Order examined the relationship between home loan
interest rates and a "perfect-market" rate for GNMA pass-through
securities.5 4 They characterized the shift toward integrated markets in
recent years as "striking."'55  According to their analysis, the fraction of
change in GNMA security yields that is reflected in conventional home
mortgage loans within two weeks rose from one-sixth in the early 1970s
to one-half in the early 1980s to one in 19886.5 They concluded that by
1988 the conventional fixed rate home mortgage loan market had become
fully integrated with general capital markets. 7
II. DIVERSITY AND UNIFORMITY: EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAWS
Compared to the rules governing commercial transactions involving
personal property, laws regulating the sale and finance of real property
have proved highly resistant to efforts to promote uniformity. Although
all states have substantially adopted the Uniform Commercial Code as
53. Id. at 23. Roth also estimated a regression equation which showed a tripling of the coeffi-
cient that measured how closely the home loan rate and the Treasury rate tracked each other. See
1d. at 23-25. Another study by Gabriel showed that from the mid- to late-1970s, only 20% of the
change in ten-year treasury yields was reflected within a week in home loan rate changes. By 1986-
87, short term responsiveness had increased by a factor of three, with nearly 80% of a change in
treasury yields being reflected in residential mortgage loan rates within one week. Gabriel, Housing
and Mortgage Market" The Post-1982 Expansion, 73 FED. RES. BULL. 893, 901 (1987); see also
Devaney & Pickerill, The Integration of Mortgage and Capital Markets, 58 APPRAISAL J. 109, 113
(1990) (Data from 1983-87 show that a 10% change in treasury bill yields leads to a 6.5% change in
the mortgage market within same month.).
54. Hendershott & Van Order, supra note 13. The authors used GNMA mortgage-backed
securities as their benchmark because GNMAs are backed by the full faith and credit of the federal
government and are traded like treasury securities. They estimated the perfect-market rate for these
securities by econometric methods. See id. at 199-02.
55. Id. at 202.
56. See id. at 202. Hendershott and Van Order also found that the percentage change in
GNMA security yields instantaneously reflected in home loan rates rose from zero in the early 1970s
to 16 in the mid-1980s to 59 in 1986-88. See id.
57. See id. at 209. Additional evidence to support the conclusion that real estate credit mar-
kets have been largely integrated with general capital markets was reported in a 1987 study that
examined interregional differences in home mortgage loan interest rates. See Zumpano, Karson &
Rudolph, Interregional Variation in Conventional Mortgage Terms and the Efficiency of the Resi-
dential Mortgage Market (1987) (unpublished paper presented at the 1987 Financial Management
Meeting in Las Vegas, Nevada). The authors found that although regional differences in the con-
tract rate for home mortgage loans were significant in 1968 and 1978, they had ceased to be statisti-
cally significant in 1988. Nevertheless, fees and other charges included in computing the effective
interest rate did reflect statistically significant regional differences. See id. at 23.
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their substantive law for personal property transactions, 58 no state has
yet adopted the Uniform Land Transactions Act proposed by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1975.19 Real estate transactions remain subject to a range of diverse laws
promulgated by each of the fifty states.
Before evaluating the normative arguments advanced for sup-
planting the existing system of state real estate finance law with uniform
national rules, in this part I briefly outline the most important areas in
which state laws governing real estate finance differ from each other. I
then recount the failure of efforts to encourage states to agree voluntarily
to adopt uniform laws governing real estate transactions. Lastly, I
examine the increasing tendency of federal courts and Congress to sup-
plant state law with federal rules in light of the states' reluctance to adopt
uniform law.
A. THE DIVERsrrY OF STATE REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAWS
State laws and customs concerning real estate finance differ from
each other in numerous respects. The following summary of differences
merely scratches the surface of these divergent practices. The typical
real estate finance transaction involves a borrower who signs a promis-
sory note that evidences the borrower's obligation to repay the lender the
sum of money advanced.6 In most cases the lender requires that the
borrower convey to it a security interest in the real property. If the bor-
rower defaults on the obligation to repay, the lender is entitled to fore-
close upon the security interest by having the real property sold, thereby
recouping some or all of the debt.6 If the proceeds of the sale exceed the
amount of the outstanding debt, the borrower is entitled to the surplus; if
58. Louisiana has adopted article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, but not article 2. Some
commentators have nevertheless noted the continued lack of uniformity in the law governing secured
financing caused by amendment and judicial interpretation. See, eg., Knippenberg & Woodward,
Uniformity and Efficiency in the Uniform Commercial Code: A Partial Research Agenda, 45 Bus.
LAW. 2519, 2520-21 (1990); Mooney, Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey:
Some Observations on the Past, Present, and Future of the U.C C, 41 Bus. LAW. 1343, 1346, 1350-53
(1986); Taylor, Uniformity of Commercial Law and State-by-State Enactment: A Confluence of Con-
tradictions, 30 HASTINGS Li. 337, 341-42 (1978).
59. See infra text accompanying notes 90-91. States have been more responsive to uniform law
in the regulation of condominiums. More than one-third of the states have adopted a version of the
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act or the Uniform Condominium Act. See Buck, Beware
the Inadvertent Condominium: The Commercial Common Interest Community - Choices Under the
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act and the Uniform Condominium Act, 22 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & Ta. J. 65, 65-66 (1987).
60. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 1.1, at 1 (2d ed. 1985).
61. See id. § 1.1, at 4.
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the foreclosure proceeds fail to extinguish the entire debt, the lender may
usually sue the borrower for the deficiency.
Although the typical transaction sketched above is common to each
of the fifty states, the states have different laws governing the form of the
transaction and the relationship between mortgagees and mortgagors.
For example, lenders in some states use mortgages as their form of secur-
ity interest while lenders in other states use deeds of trust. A mortgage
conveys an interest in the property directly to the lender whereas a trust
deed conveys the property to a trustee to hold for the benefit of the
lender.62 The legal significance of the conveyance of a mortgage or deed
of trust also differs among states. A mortgage or deed of trust in a title
theory state gives the mortgagee or trustee legal title to the property,
subject to defeasance upon the repayment of the debt. In lien theory
states, however, the mortgage or deed of trust merely grants the mortga-
gee or trustee a lien against the property with no present rights to posses-
sion or title.63
State laws differ most greatly with respect to the methods a mortga-
gee may use to foreclose its mortgage or deed of trust and the protections
accorded to borrowers." All states permit mortgagees to utilize judicial
foreclosure.65 Upon default by a mortgagor, the mortgagee may file an
action in court to foreclose its lien on the real property. All parties -
including junior lienors - whose interests in the property will be extin-
guished by the foreclosure action must be served notice of the proceed-
ing. At the foreclosure proceeding any defendant may assert a defense
against the foreclosure action. Most foreclosure actions are uncontested:
the court usually grants a judgment to the mortgagee and directs the sale
62. Deeds of trust are typically utilized in states that permit foreclosure by power of sale. See
infra text accompanying notes 68-69. Since power of sale foreclosure takes place without court
supervision and frequently results in the lender purchasing the property, a trustee is utilized to
insulate the lender from charges of conflict of interest.
63. Some states characterize mortgages or deeds of trust according to a hybrid model that has
characteristics of both title and lien theory. These states are usually characterized as "intermediate
theory" states. Lien theory states are typically those in the western portion of the United States; title
states are typically located in the East. The practical significance of whether a state characterizes a
mortgage or deed of trust as conveying title or a lien may be more apparent than real. In most title
states, courts do not permit a mortgagee to take possession of the real property as long as the mort-
gagor remains in good standing under the loan. Indeed, even after default, some title theory states
do not permit lenders to gain possession of the property until after they foreclose the mortgage or
deed of trust. See G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 60, § 1.5, at 10-11.
64. In addition to differences in the methods of foreclosure, states prescribe varying notice
periods and have different rules governing the remedies of mortgagees prior to foreclosure. See R.
LiFroN, PRACTICAL REAL ESTATE IN THE '80s: LEGAL, TAX AND BUSINESS STRATEGIES 286-93
(2d ed. 1983).
65. See G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 60, § 7.11, at 505-06.
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of the property by a court officer.66 Judicial foreclosure has been criti-
cized by many commentators as expensive and time-consuming. 67 Half
of the states permit mortgagees to utilize private power of sale foreclo-
sure. If the mortgage or deed of trust includes a power of sale clause, the
mortgagee may bypass the courts and have the property sold without
judicial supervision. After publication of notice, the trustee or sheriff8
conducts a sale of the property. Power of sale foreclosure usually is more
expeditious and less expensive than judicial foreclosure and is therefore
frequently preferred by lenders.6 9 In addition to judicial and power of
sale foreclosure, at least two states permit strict foreclosure.7 Under
strict foreclosure, upon default the mortgagee is entitled to retain the
property pledged as security for the loan regardless of whether its value
exceeds the amount of the outstanding debt.71
Besides widely divergent mortgage foreclosure practices, states pro-
vide a wide variety of postforeclosure remedies. Close to half of the
states have enacted statutory rights of redemption.72 A typical statutory
right of redemption permits the mortgagor to buy back the property sold
at the foreclosure sale by paying the successful bidder the price paid at
66. For a description of the mechanics of foreclosure sales, see IL KRATOVIL & IL WERNER,
MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE § 41.09 (1981).
67. See G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 60, § 7.11, at 506 (stating that judicial foreclo-
sure is "complicated, costly, and time-consuming"); Clauretie, State Foreclosure Laws, Risk Shiftlng,
and the Private Mortgage Insurance Industry, 56 J. RIsK & INS. 544, 546 (1989) (stating that judicial
foreclosure proceedings are costly).
68. Ifa power of sale clause is included in a mortgage, the mortgagee will typically delegate the
responsibility for conducting the sale to a third party such as the county sheriff. The use of a third
party insulates the mortgagee from charges of conflict of interest should it happen to purchase the
property at the foreclosure sale. The conflict of interest problem may also be avoided by using a
deed of trust rather than a mortgage. See supra note 62.
69. Nevertheless, some lenders prefer judicial foreclosure, despite its expense, because of the
greater certainty of title produced by judicial confirmation of the foreclosure sale. In addition, two
commentators have suggested that mortgagees might prefer judicial foreclosure because power of
sale foreclosure may be subject to due process objections if a court finds state action and the property
is sold without appropriate notice. See RK KRATOVIL & K. WERNER, supra note 66, at § 41.08(c),
(h).
70. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-15 (West 1978 & Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 4528 (1973 & Supp. 1990). Strict foreclosure usually takes place only after a judicial proceeding.
See G. NELSON & D. WHrImAN, supra note 60, § 7.9, at 501.
71. See G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 60, § 7.9, at 501.
72. A statutory right of redemption is different from the equity of redemption. Under the law
of all states, mortgagors possess an equity of redemption that permits them to avoid foreclosure by
repaying all sums owed to the mortgagee prior to the foreclosure sale. If a mortgagor exercises its
equity of redemption, it is either reinstated in good standing under the loan or is entitled to a recon-
veyance of the mortgage lien. Technically, the foreclosure action cuts off the equity of redemption.
Statutory rights of redemption come into play only after the equity of redemption has been fore-
closed. A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE 189 n.21 (3d
ed. 1986).
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the foreclosure sale plus costs and interest.73 The period during which
the mortgagor can exercise the statutory right of redemption varies from
three months to two years. 74 Usually, the mortgagor is entitled to retain
possession of the mortgaged property during the redemption period.75
States have also enacted a wide variety of laws designed to protect
mortgagors from personal liability in the event that the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale are less than the outstanding debt. Several states flatly
prohibit mortgagees from seeking deficiency judgments against purchase
money mortgagors.76 Some statutes prohibit deficiency judgments only
when a particular type of foreclosure process is utilized, most commonly
the power of sale foreclosure.17 Many states limit the amount of defi-
ciency judgments to the difference between the outstanding loan princi-
pal and the fair market value of the property on the date of the
foreclosure sale rather than the difference between the outstanding debt
and the price obtained at the sale.78 Several states permit suits for defi-
ciency judgments, but protect mortgagors from a multiplicity of lawsuits
by "one action" rules.79 The typical one action rule requires a mortgagee
to bring its claim for a deficiency judgment as part of the foreclosure
action; otherwise the mortgagee forfeits its right to a deficiency
judgment.
73. See, ag., IOWA CODE ANN. § 628.11 (West 1950 & Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
2414(a) (1983).
74. Compare WYo. STAT. § 1-18-103(a) (1989) (ninety day redemption period) with S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-52-13 (1987) (The redemption period may be extended to two years.).
75. See eg., Ropfogel v. Enegren, 7 Kan. App. 2d 644, 647, 646 P.2d 1138, 1141 (1982) ('The
debtor is given the right of possession during the redemption period and the rents and profits derived
from the mortgaged property during that period are exempt from seizure by any creditor not author-
ized to levy by the redemption statute."); G. NELSON & D. WHITmAN, supra note 60, § 8.4, at 616
(presenting a general discussion of statutory redemptions). For a more detailed description of the
structure and purposes served by statutory rights of redemption and anti-deficiency judgment legisla-
tion, see Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489 (1991).
76. See eg., ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-814(G) (1990) (No deficiency judgment is permit-
ted when the trust property is two and one-half acres or smaller and used as a one or two family
residence.); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580(b) (West 1976 & Supp. 1991) (No deficiency judgment is
permitted when a purchase money mortgage or deed of trust is foreclosed if the property is used as a
dwelling by the borrower.).
77. See, e-g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(d) (West 1976 & Supp. 1991) (No deficiency judg-
ment is permitted when the property is foreclosed under a power of sale.).
78. See eg., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACrs. § 1371 (McKinney 1979) (The court determines the
market value.); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-3-660 to -740 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989) (The defend-
ant may request an appraisal.). As of 1980, seventeen states had adopted statutes limiting deficiency
judgments to the difference between fair market value and the outstanding loan balance. Washburn,
The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL.
L. REv. 843, 908 (1980).
79. See eg., MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222 (1989) (Only one action is allowed for recovery on
a debt secured by a mortgage.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.430 (Michie 1986) (same).
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B. EFFORTs TO PROMOTE VOLUNTARY ADOPTION OF UNIFORM
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW
In the face of widely divergent state laws, efforts have been made to
encourage states to adopt uniform laws to regulate real estate transac-
tions. The first efforts to promote uniform real estate law date from the
early part of this century. The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws proposed the Uniform Real Estate Mortgage Act
of 1927, and in 1940 proposed the Model Power of Sale Foreclosure Act.
Neither of these suggested laws was adopted by a single state.80
In 1975 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws tried once again to promote uniform state real estate laws.
After six years of drafting, the Conference adopted the Uniform Land
Transactions Act (ULTA). The ULTA had initially covered a wide vari-
ety of real estate issues including contracts, conveyancing, finance, con-
dominiums, recording, priorities and mechanics liens. In response to
concerns that the uniform law would be too unwieldy, the version
adopted by the Commissioners was limited to contracts, conveyancing,
and finance.8 Following review and recommendations by the American
Bar Association, the Commissioners amended the ULTA in 1977, and it
was endorsed by the ABA in 1978.82
Prefatory comments to the ULTA indicate that the Commissioners
felt that uniform law was necessary to facilitate the operation of the sec-
ondary mortgage market and to make real estate sales and financing
transactions more economical and efficient.8 3 The ULTA was designed
to resemble the Uniform Commercial Code and adopted many of the
Code's definitions and principles. 4 Article 3 applies to all real estate-
80. See Reeve, The New Proposal for a Uniform Real Estate Mortgage Act, 5 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 564, 570 (1938); Note, The Secondary Mortgage Market and State Regulation of Real
Estate Financing, 36 EMORY L.J 971, 1001 n.139 (1987) (authored by Jo Anne Bradner). In addi-
tion, the federally sponsored Central Housing Committee proposed a revised Uniform Real Estate
Mortgage Act in 1937. No state has yet adopted this proposal. See L SKILTON, GOVERNMENT
AND THE MORTGAGE DEBTOR (1929 To 1939) 203-04 (1944).
81. See Bruce, An Overview of the Uniform Land Transactions Act and the Uniform Simplifica-
tion of Land Transfers Act, 10 STETsoN L. REv. 1, 2 (1980). The portions of the original proposal
dealing with recording, priorities, and mechanics liens were included in the Uniform Simplification
of Land Transfers Act approved by the Commissioners in 1976. The portions discussing condomini-
ums were redrafted as the Uniform Condominium Act and approved by the Commissioners in 1977.
Id.
82. ULTA, 13 U.L.A. 469 (1986).
83. See ULTA, Prefatory Note, 13 U.L.A. at 470. The Commissioners also expressed a desire
to simplify and modernize the laws governing real estate transactions. Id. at 470-71.
84. See Bruce, supra note 81, at 4-5 (The ULTA borrows definitions and principles from the
UCC.). The concepts imported into real estate law from the Uniform Commercial Code include
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secured transactions, regardless of whether the security interest used is a
mortgage or deed of trust, or whether the state adheres to lien or title
theory. Among the more important provisions of the ULTA are its rules
permitting mortgagees to take possession of the real property after
default and allowing them to enforce due-on-sale clauses.
The ULTA's most important provisions concern foreclosure. Under
the Act, the preferred method of foreclosure is by power of sale. 5 The
Act permits mortgagees to bypass judicial foreclosure, provided that rela-
tively stringent notice requirements are met. The ULTA also requires
that every aspect of the sale be reasonable. A major innovation of the
ULTA is the concept of the "protected party." The primary protected
party is the individual homeowner.8 6 Under the Act, protected parties
are entitled to grace periods17 and are immune to deficiency judgments
on purchase money security interests.8" The ULTA, however, abolishes
statutory rights of redemption for all mortgagors, including protected
parties.8 9
The real estate bar greeted the ULTA with a mixture of criticism
and praise.' However, if the Act's success or failure is measured by how
many states have adopted it, the ULTA has been a dismal failure. To
date, no state has adopted the ULTA. In 1985, the Conference tried
once again to promote uniform real estate finance law by revising Article
3 of the ULTA and renaming it the Uniform Land Security Interest Act
(ULSIA). To date, no state has adopted the ULSIA, although propo-
nents expect that it will soon be introduced in several state legislatures.91
good faith and unconscionability. Id. See ULTA § 1-301, 13 U.L.A. at 493 (discussing good faith
obligation); ULTA § 1-311, 13 U.L.A. at 502 (discussing unconscionability).
85. See ULTA § 3-508, 13 U.L.A. at 613; Bruce, supra note 81, at 12 (rhe preferred method of
foreclosure is power of sale.); Pedowitz, Mortgage Foreclosure Under the Uniform Land Transactions
Act (As Amended), 6 REAL Esr. L.J. 179, 187 (1978) (same). Judicial sale is also available as an
option to mortgagees. ULTA § 3-509, 13 U.L.A. at 616.
86. ULTA § 1-203(a), 13 U.L.A. at 490.
87. A notice of intention to foreclose on a property occupied by a protected party may not be
sent until a period of five weeks after nonpayment or nonperformance has elapsed. ULTA § 3-
505(b), 13 U.L.A. at 609.
88. ULTA § 3-510(b), 13 U.L.A. at 618.
89. See Pedowitz, supra note 85, at 195.
90. Compare Kuklin, The Uniform Land Transactions AcL" Article 3, 11 REAL PRop., PROB. &
TR. J. 12 (1976) (criticizing ULTA) with Pedowitz, supra note 85, at 197-98 (approving ULTA).
91. Telephone interview with Norman Geis, Esq., Chairman of the American College of Real
Estate Lawyers Committee on Law Reform (Apr. 16, 1990).
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C. IMPOSITION OF FEDERAL LAW
In light of the consistent failure of efforts to persuade states volunta-
rily to adopt uniform law, federal courts and the Congress have increas-
ingly intervened to reject state real estate finance laws. One area in
which federal imposition of uniform rules occurs is the foreclosure of
loans by the federal government. As I discussed in Part I, the federal
government has actively participated in the mortgage market for the past
fifty years through its mortgage insurance programs administered by
FHA and through the purchase and sale of mortgage loans by GNMA or
by federally related agencies such as FHLMC or FNMA. 92 Frequently,
the government, as mortgagee, must foreclose mortgage liens. 93 In sev-
eral cases, federal courts have ruled that state mortgage foreclosure laws
do not apply when the federal government is the mortgagee.
One of the earliest federal cases rejecting an element of state mort-
gage foreclosure law is a 1970 decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, United States v. Stadium Apartments.94 In Stadium Apart-
ments, the mortgagor of an FHA-insured apartment complex waived its
statutory right of redemption when it executed an FHA-approved mort-
gage. Upon default by the mortgagor, the mortgagee assigned the mort-
gage to the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) which obtained a foreclosure judgment. The dis-
trict court held that the mortgagor's waiver of its redemption rights was
unenforceable and decreed a one year statutory right of redemption pur-
suant to Idaho law. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that federal law applied to the foreclosure action, that Congress
had not expressly adopted state law, and that federal courts should not
borrow the state redemption law as federal common law. Among the
reasons given by the court for its refusal to borrow state law was its con-
cern that the federal government should not be subject to the "vagaries of
the laws of the several states."95 The court also indicated that statutory
rights of redemption would harm the federal interest by increasing the
cost of foreclosure and chilling the bidding at the foreclosure sale.
96
92. See supra text accompanying notes 10-39.
93. The federal government may become a mortgagee when it is assigned the mortgage as a
result of a default under mortgage insurance programs or because it holds the mortgage in its own
portfolio.
94. 425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970).
95. Id. at 364 (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)).
96. See id. at 365-66. The continued vitality of Stadium Apartments remains in some doubt.
Subsequent to the ruling in Stadium Apartments, the Supreme Court set forth a new standard to
govern when federal courts should borrow state law as the federal rule of decision in cases involving
federal creditors. In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979), the Court held that
1280
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Numerous other federal court decisions have refused to borrow state
real estate finance laws when the federal government or a federally-
related agency is the mortgagee. For example, in United States v. Victory
Highway Village,97 the Eighth Circuit held that state statutory rights of
redemption did not apply to a foreclosure in which FNMA was the mort-
gagee.98 The paramount reason underlying the court's refusal to borrow
state law as the federal rule of decision was its concern that foreclosure
laws and practices would differ from state to state.99 In United States v.
Haddon Haciendas C6,1 °' the Ninth Circuit ruled that California
antideficiency law would not stand in the way of federal damage actions
against mortgagors for waste. The court observed that state rules insu-
lating mortgagors from damages for waste would lead to poor mainte-
nance of federally subsidized housing.10'
in the absence of a congressional directive to the contrary, state law governs the relative priority of
private and consensual liens arising from federal programs. The Court adopted a three part test to
determine whether state law should be adopted as the federal rule of decision in similar cases: (1)
whether the federal program by its nature must be uniform throughout the nation; (2) whether
application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal program; and (3) the extent
to which application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated upon state
laws. See id. at 728-30. Commentators have suggested that the Kimbell Foods test is much more
deferential to state law than the test adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Stadium Apartments. See e'g.,
Note, Toward Adoption of State Law as the Federal Rule of Decision in Cases Involving Voluntary
Federal Creditors, 73 MINN. L. REV. 171, 189 (1988); cf Burbank, Interurisdictional Preclusion,
Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733,
758 (1986) ("Increasingly, the Court, while asserting that a matter is governed by federal law, has
determined that there is no need for a uniform federal rule."). Indeed, subsequent decisions by the
Ninth Circuit have borrowed state statutory redemption laws in foreclosures brought by the Small
Business Administration ("SBA") and the Farmers Housing Administration ("FmHA"). See
United States v. Pastos, 781 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1986) (SBA); United States v. Ellis, 714 F.2d 953 (9th
Cir. 1983) (FmHA). Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has been careful to avoid overturning Stadium
Apartments. See Pastos, 781 F.2d at 752 (distinguishing FHA from SBA). In addition, courts in
other circuits continue to rely upon Stadium Apartments as precedent. See, eg., United States v.
Victory Highway Village, 662 F.2d 488, 497-98 (8th Cir. 1981) (refusing to borrow Minnesota statu-
tory right of redemption in HUD foreclosure); United States v. Elverud, 640 F. Supp. 692, 696
(D.N.D. 1986) (refusing to borrow North Dakota right of redemption in FmHA foreclosure).
97. 662 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1981).
98. See also United States v. Elverud, 640 F. Supp. 692 (D.N.D. 1986) (rhe FmHA is not
subject to a state statutory right of redemption.). But see United States v. Ellis, 714 F.2d 953 (9th
Cir. 1983) (The FmHA is subject to a state statutory right of redemption.); United States v. Pastos,
781 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1986) (The SBA is subject to a state statutory right of redemption.).
99. See Victory Highway Village, 662 F.2d at 498.
100. 541 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1976). See also United States v. Gish, 559 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1977)
(The court refused to borrow an Alaska anti-deficiency judgment law in an SBA foreclosure.), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978); United States v. Larson, 632 F. Supp. 1565 (D.N.D. 1986) (The court
refused to apply a North Dakota anti-deficiency judgment law in an SBA foreclosure.). But see
United States v. Dismuke, 616 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1980) (The court borrowed a Georgia anti-defi-
ciency judgment statute in an SBA foreclosure.); United States v. Vallejo, 660 F. Supp. 535 (W.D.
Wa. 1987) (The court borrowed a Washington anti-deficiency judgment law in a VA foreclosure.).
101. See Haddon Haciendas, 541 F.2d at 784.
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The courts have not been alone in creating a federal real estate
finance law to replace that of the states. Prior to the 1970s, the regula-
tion of real estate transactions was almost entirely the domain of state
and local governments.1 "2 However, beginning in the mid-1970s and
accelerating in the 1980s, Congress has repeatedly overridden state real
estate finance law in favor of uniform national law. The first effort to
achieve national real estate law was the Federal Mortgage Foreclosure
Act proposed by the Nixon administration in 1973.103 The bill included
a series of congressional findings blaming disparate state laws for inhib-
iting the free flow of mortgage money to homeowners, burdening federal
programs, increasing the costs of borrowing, and impeding the secondary
mortgage market.104 Under the legislation, all mortgages made, owned,
insured, or guaranteed by an instrumentality of the federal government
would have been subject to a uniform system of mortgage foreclosure.105
A mortgage foreclosure commissioner, appointed by the Secretary of
HUD, would have been empowered to conduct non-judicial foreclosure
proceedings. 1 6 In addition, the bill would have expressly abolished all
state statutory rights of redemption.1 7 The Federal Mortgage Foreclo-
sure Act, a part of the Housing Act of 1973, failed to pass Congress.
However, in 1968 and 1974, Congress passed and the President
signed two laws designed to protect home loan consumers. The Truth-
in-Lending Act of 196810 requires lenders to supply borrowers with a
wide range of information including the amount of the loan, the finance
charge as expressed by the "annual percentage rate," the payment sched-
ule, the default and delinquency charges, the prepayment penalties, and
102. See C. EDSON & B. JACOBS, supra note 10, at § 10.1 ("Until the end of the 1960's there was
no practice of law more locally oriented than residential real estate.").
103. S. 2507, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 401-419 (1973) reprinted in Administration's 1973 Housing
Proposals Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 394 (1973). In 1969, a federal commission had urged the administration to study real
estate laws "with a view toward making them more uniform across the country." COMMISSION ON
MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MORTGAGE INTEREST RATES TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE CONGRESS 117 (1969).
104. See S. 2507, supra note 103, at § 402. FNMA was among the entities that testified in favor
of the Federal Mortgage Foreclosure Act. In his statement, the chairman of FNMA condemned the
lack of uniformity of state foreclosure laws, blaming these laws in part for the under-maintenance
and vandalism of inner city properties. See Housing and Community Development Legislation 1973:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Housing of the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of
Representatives, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1182-88 (1973) (prepared statement of Oaldey Hunter, Presi-
dent and Chairman of the Board, Federal National Mortgage Association).
105. S. 2507, supra note 103, at § 404.
106. Id. §§ 405-412.
107. Id. § 415(d).
108. Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. I, 83 Stat. 146 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§1601-1665
(1988) as part of the Consumer Credit Protection Act).
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the nature of the property securing the loan."° Although the Truth-in-
Lending Act did not formally preempt state regulation, it has greatly
influenced the requirements of state disclosure laws. 110 The Real Estate
Settlement and Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA) requires all lenders of
federally related"1 I residential mortgage loans to make available to mort-
gagors settlement forms listing, in detail, all charges that the mortgagor
will be responsible for at the settlement or closing of the transaction. 2
In addition, the legislation requires the distribution of booklets to all bor-
rowers explaining the real estate transaction and the rights of mortgagors
under RESPA.'1 3 The Act also restricts the payments of fees or kick-
backs for referrals incident to settlement services. 114
Congress enacted more intrusive federal regulation in the 1980s. In
1980, it passed the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act 1 5 which included a limited preemption of state usury laws.
The Act preempted state laws that limited the amount of interest, dis-
count points, finance charges, or other charges for mortgage loans
secured by first liens on most types of residential property. States were
permitted to reinstate their usury laws, provided that they acted before
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (1988). The required disclosures under the Truth-in-Lending Act
were limited by the Truth-in-Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221,
tit. VI, 94 Stat. 168 (1980). They now focus on the amount financed, the annual percentage rate, the
total finance charge, payments, and sales price.
110. See Eskridge, One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant
with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1083, 1100 (1984) (In practice, the federal law dictates state disclosure requirements.).
I 11. A federally-related loan is a loan related to HUD or intended to be sold to FNMA,
GNMA, or FHLMC. In addition, all loans made by lenders with federally insured deposits or
regulated by federal agencies are deemed to be federally related. See 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1) (1988).
Therefore, RESPA applies to virtually all home mortgage loan transactions. See C. EDSON & B.
JACOBS, supra note 10, at § 10.02(lXa).
112. RESPA, Pub. L. No. 95-533, § 4, 88 Stat. 1724, 1725 (1974) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 2603 (1988)).
113. See id. § 5 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2604 (1988)).
114. See id. § 8(a) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (1988)). Additional federal regu-
lation of home loan mortgage transactions prohibits discrimination. See Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-2000, tit. I, § 302, 89 Stat. 1124, 1125 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 2801 (1988)); Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, tit. VIII, §§ 802-
806, 91 Stat. 1111, 1147-48 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (1988)); Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 701, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521 (1974) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1691 (1988)); Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 804-901, 82 Stat. 73, 81-80 (1968)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988)).
115. Pub. L. No. 96-221, tit. V, § 501(aX1), 94 Stat. 132, 161 (1980) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1735f-7 (1988)).
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April 1, 1983.116 Among the reasons given for the preemption of usury
laws was the concern that mortgage funds would not be available in
states with usury restrictions, thereby frustrating national housing objec-
tives. 117 Preemption was also justified as necessary to the proper func-
tioning of the secondary mortgage market."' 8
The Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1981119 enacted
several of the principles that had been proposed in the 1973 Federal
Mortgage Foreclosure Act for mortgage loans held by the federal govern-
ment. 2° The Act provides for the appointment of a foreclosure commis-
sioner, nonjudicial foreclosure, and the abolition of postforeclosure rights
of redemption. 2 ' Among the justifications for preemption included in
the Senate Budget Committee's report is the need to reduce costly delays
in foreclosing mortgage loans that result in property deterioration, as
well as management and holding expenses. The law was also designed to
provide "an efficient, equitable and, most important, relatively expedi-
tious nonjudicial foreclosure remedy." '22
In 1982, federal preemption resolved one of the largest legal contro-
versies involving real estate in recent memory-the enforceability of the
"due-on-sale" clause. A due-on-sale clause is a provision in a promissory
note or mortgage that permits the mortgagee to accelerate payment of
the debt in the event that the property securing the loan is sold without
the mortgagee's express permission. 2 3 As interest rates soared in the
early 1980s, lenders increasingly exercised their acceleration option when
properties were sold. A number of state legislatures and courts enacted
laws or handed down decisions declaring due-on-sale clauses unenforce-
able as unreasonable restraints on alienation. 2 4 In 1976, the Federal
116. Fifteen states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have reinstated their usury laws. For
a list of states that have reinstated their usury laws, see C. EDSON & B. JACOBS, supra note 10,
§ 10.03 & n.70.
117. S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 236, 254-55.
118. See id.
119. The Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 361-3691, 95
Stat. 422, 422-31, is contained in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3701-3717 (1988).
120. Since the overwhelming majority of mortgage loans are held by private investors, the Mul.
tifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act governs only a small percentage of all mortgage foreclosures.
121. See 12 U.S.C. § 3713(d) (1988).
122. S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 264 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONO. &
ADMn .NEWS 396, 560.
123. See, eg., Dawn Inv. Co. v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 695, 697, 639 P.2d 974, 975, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 332, 333 (1982).
124. See, e-g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 374
(1978).
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Home Loan Bank Board issued a regulation preempting state restrictions
on the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses with respect to loans held by
federally chartered thrift institutions, an action that was later upheld by
the Supreme Court in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. de la
Cuesta.125 Congress thereupon enacted, as part of the Garn-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982,126 a law that preempted all state
interference with the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses, regardless of
the identity of the lender or the nature of the property. Congress acted
to protect the solvency of lending institutions as well as the efficiency of
the secondary mortgage market. According to the Senate report accom-
panying the legislation, "[d]ue on sale restrictions ... adversely affect
secondary mortgage markets, which rely on uniform, homogenous mort-
gage documents to efficiently operate and provide mortgage money for
lenders and home buyers."' 27
The revolution of real estate finance that has occurred over the past
two decades has already resulted in dramatic changes in real estate law.
The responsibility for enacting laws governing real estate transactions,
once the exclusive province of states and localities, has begun to shift to
the federal government.1 28 Having failed to adopt uniform law volunta-
rily, states are now in the position of having uniformity imposed by Con-
gress. In the remainder of this Article, I explore the normative case for
125. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
126. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
127. S. REP. No. 536, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1982) reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 3054, 3075. The President of FHLMC testified before Congress in support of pre-
emption. According to his submission to a House subcommittee, "[w]ithout this type of preemption,
it is difficult for the Corporation and other nationwide secondary market participants to administer
different due-on-sale policies to comply with the different state laws especially when the laws are in
such a state of flux." See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation's Decision to Enforce Due-on-
Sale Clause" Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Gov't Operations House of Repre-
sentatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1982) (letter from Philip Brinkerhoff, President of FHLMC, to
Kent Colton, Staff Director, President's Commission on Housing, July 31, 1981).
128. In addition, to the Truth-in-Lending Act, RESPA, the Depository Institutions Deregula-
tion and Monetary Control Act, the Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act and the Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act, Congress has passed two other major pieces of legislation that
have preempted state laws affecting real estate finance. In 1982, Congress enacted the Alternative
Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982 as part of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 3801 (1988). The Act preempts state restrictions on lenders that originate
alternative mortgage loans. The Act permitted states to override the federal preemption if they acted
before October 15, 1985. Three states chose to retain restrictions. See C. EDSON & B. JACOBS, supra
note 10, § 10.05 & n.101. Congress also passed and the President signed the Secondary Mortgage
Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). The Act preempts state blue sky regulations for private issuers of
mortgage-backed securities. States may act within seven years to reinstate their blue sky regulations.
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supplanting diverse state real estate finance laws with uniform national
law.
III. AN EVALUATION OF THE CASE FOR UNIFORM
NATIONAL REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW
Initiatives to promote uniformity of mortgage law, either through
voluntary state enactment of uniform laws or through federal preemp-
tion, have more often been justified by vague generalities than by rea-
soned analysis. Typically, a uniform national rule of law is proposed to
reduce the substantial costs supposedly generated by diverse state
rules129 or to promote the growth of the secondary mortgage market. 30
Not infrequently, federal preemption is proposed to reform existing real
estate finance law, although no reason is advanced as to why the federal
government, rather than the states, is the appropriate body to legislate
the reform.131
In this Part, I critically examine several arguments for preempting
state real estate finance laws and establishing uniform law. My focus is
on laws relating to mortgage foreclosure.1 32 The justifications most fre-
quently given for federal preemption of state commercial law can be clus-
tered under three categories: (1) State lawmaking promotes economic
inefficiency;1 33 (2) population characteristics and economic circum-
stances in the United States do not substantially differ among states so as
129. See eg., Clauretie & Herzog, How State Laws Affect Foreclosure Costs, 6 SECONDARY
MORTGAGE MARKETs 25, 28 (1989) (rhe awareness that foreclosure laws affect lender and insurer
losses may spur efforts to implement uniform law.); Pedowitz, supra note 85, at 198 (Uniformity can
engender confidence in lenders that collateral may be reached without high expense and delay.).
130. See, g., Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market-A Catalyst for Change in Real Estate
Transactions, 39 Sw. L.J. 991, 1018 (1986) ("IFlor the law to facilitate a competitive market in
mortgage-related securities authority must exist at the national level to coordinate, administer, and
develop appropriate regulations and legal doctrines."); Note, Balancing Private and Public Initiatives
in the Mortgage-Backed Security Market, 18 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 426, 443 (1983) (authored
by Andrew Lance) (Proposals for uniform law raised hopes that impediments to the secondary mort-
gage markets would be removed.); ULTA, Prefatory Note, 13 U.L.A. 469, 470 (1986) (Variance in
the law is an impediment to the secondary mortgage market.).
131. See, eg., G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 60, § 8.8, at 631 ("Because the mortgage
market is pervasively national in scope and its impact on the national economy is increasingly signifi-
cant, the traditional state by state approach to real estate foreclosure is a luxury of federalism we can
ill continue to afford.").
132. The main reason for this emphasis is that state laws concerning mortgage foreclosure are
particularly idiosyncratic. See supra text accompanying notes 64-79. In addition, most proponents
of uniform mortgage law and federal preemption have singled out laws relating to mortgage foreclo-
sure for special criticism.
133. See infra notes 139-185 and accompanying text.
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to justify divergent legal rules;134 and (3) state legislative processes are
inferior to those of the federal government.13 I conclude that none of
these rationales is sufficiently supported to justify preemption of state
mortgage foreclosure laws.
Implicit in my analysis is the proposition that proponents of pre-
empting state real estate finance law bear the burden of persuasion. State
regulation of real property has been ingrained in our legal tradition since
the nation was founded. In particular, throughout our history, Congress
and the federal courts have deferred to state legislative choices with
respect to the manner in which debts may be enforced against property
owners. 136 Of course, the mere fact that a legal norm is part of a vener-
able tradition should not stand in the way of reevaluating its desirability
in light of societal change. Nevertheless, several factors counsel against
changing the structure of real estate finance law in the absence of a
strong theoretical or empirical justification. First, the time horizon of
residential real estate investments is typically lengthy, often ranging up
to and beyond thirty years. Therefore, reliance upon settled legal rules
and predictable patterns of legal evolution is especially important in this
area. In addition, any change in law entails significant costs. Finally,
one advantage of state lawmaking as compared to federal legislation is
the expanded possibility for the adoption of new and innovative legal
rules and policies. As Justice Brandeis observed in his famous dissent in
134. See infra notes 186-209 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 210-282 and accompanying text.
136. Historically, Congress has been particularly solicitous of state procedures for executing
money judgments. In response to court decisions holding that federal courts did not have an obliga-
tion to borrow state laws with respect to judgment executions, Congress enacted a law in 1828 that
provided in part that "writs of execution and other final process issued on judgments" in federal
courts should "be the same, except their style, in each state, respectively, as are now used in the
courts of such state." Process Act of 1828, ch. 68, 4 Stat. 278, 281 (1846). For an exhaustive history
of the debates surrounding the Process Act of 1828 and other statutes prescribing adherence to state
judgment execution procedures, see Warren, Federal Process and State Legislation, 16 VA. L. REv.
421, 435-50 (1930). The requirement that federal courts adhere to state judgment execution proce-
dures exists today in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) which requires that "[t]he procedure on
execution, in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of a judgment, and in proceedings on and in
aid of execution shall be in accordance with the practice and procedure of the state in which the
district court is held, existing at the time the remedy is sought, except that any statute of the United
States governs to the extent that it is applicable." FED. R. CIrv. P. 69(a). Several courts have
observed that Rule 69(a) applies to mortgage foreclosure actions. See Federal Land Bank v. Hassler,
595 F.2d 356, 358 (6th Cir. 1979) (The court applied Rule 69(a) to a mortgage foreclosure sale and
held that a judicial sale in accordance with Michigan practice does not constitute a seizure or levy
entitling a U.S. Marshal to a commission.); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 509 F.2d 83, 90 (9th Cir.
1974) (same). But see United States v. Petty Motor Co., 767 F.2d 712, 715 (10th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1056 (1986) (A judicial sale in a mortgage foreclosure is not the same as an execu-
tion on a judgment and therefore does not fall within the scope of Rule 69(a).).
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New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,137 states can experiment with a variety of
policy approaches. Successful innovations can be adopted by other states
or the federal government. 1 8 The negative effects of "failed" experi-
ments, however, can usually be limited to the citizens of one state, rather
than spread throughout the nation.
A. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
Uniform national real estate finance law might be desirable if the
existence of diverse state laws led to economic inefficiency. In this sec-
tion, I examine several possible sources of economic inefficiency caused
by state legislation. Specifically, I analyze whether state real estate
finance laws might be inefficient as a result of spillovers and interstate
competition, transaction costs, and lost economies of scale. I conclude
that, unlike some areas of commercial law, diversity resulting from state
regulation of real estate finance is unlikely to be inefficient. In fact, effi-
ciency considerations may even provide modest support for the existence
of state mortgage laws.
1. Spillovers and Interstate Competition
Economic efficiency requires that the benefits of government regula-
tion exceed the costs. 39 Economists and lawyers have long recognized
that laws are more likely to be efficient if all of the costs and benefits of a
regulation fall within the political jurisdiction responsible for enacting
the legislation. 4 ' To the extent that the costs of a law or policy exceed
the benefits generated, residents of the political jurisdiction would have
an incentive to convince their elected representatives to amend or repeal
137. 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) ("[A] single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country."). For a discussion of the role of states in policy experimentation, see Schill,
Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
829, 870-71 (1989).
138. Among the state initiatives later adopted by the federal government are unemployment
compensation, health and safety regulations, and public financing of political campaigns. See Ben-
son, Values of Decentralized Government in ESSAYS IN FEDERALISM 1, 13-14 (1961); Derthick, Pre-
serving Federalism: Congress the States, and the Supreme Court, 4 BROOKINGS REv. 32 (1986).
State experimentation has also served as a model for other states. See Scheiber, American Federal.
ism and the Diffusion of Power: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 9 U. TOL. L. REv. 619,
636 (1978).
139. See F. STEPHEN, THE ECONOMICS OF THE LAW 58-59 (1988) (discussing the Kaldor-
Hicks measure of efficiency and its relationship to cost-benefit analysis).
140. See W. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 3-20 (1972); Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Econom-
ics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 45 (1983); Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers Legisla-
tion and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 457, 466 (1988).
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the inefficient legislation or, alternatively, to apply pressure indirectly by
exiting the community. These incentives to use voice or exit141 to repeal
or avoid inefficient government regulation would diminish considerably if
some or all of the costs of the regulation were externalized to citizens of
other jurisdictions.
Numerous opportunities exist for a state to enact legislation with
benefits that are largely internalized, but with costs that are substantially
externalized.142 For example, some states might enact product liability
laws to protect their citizens. Manufacturers encounter serious difficul-
ties in charging citizens of any one state the marginal cost generated by
their product liability laws. Among the most important reasons that dif-
ferential pricing is so difficult is that personal property, the subject of the
regulation, can easily be transported from state to state. 143 Even if man-
ufacturers were able to charge retailers in a protective state the marginal
costs of that state's product liability law, 1 4 a resident of a protective
state could shop in a state that had no product liability law where the
price would presumably be lower, bring the product back to his or her
home state, and still take advantage of that state's protective laws. Since
developing and administering an effective system of differential pricing
would be costly or impossible, 145 residents of states with especially pro-
tective product liability laws do not bear the full costs of their regulation
and may enact an inefficient level of protection when viewed from the
economy as a whole.
Lax state regulation may also generate economic inefficiency
because of externalized costs.146 The most obvious example is air pollu-
tion. Frequently air pollution generated by automobiles or industries in a
141. See A. HiRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICF, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLiNE iN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
142. In some cases the externalized costs are merely incidental to the achievement of state objec-
tives. In other cases the externalization of costs is an integral part of the legislative program. See
Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REv. 563, 570-75 (1983) (dis-
cussing state efforts to disadvantage out-of-state commercial interests by enacting import restraints,
natural resource severance taxes, and income taxes on interstate businesses already subject to taxa-
tion elsewhere).
143. See Rice, Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism, 65 B.U.L. REv. 1, 56
(1985).
144. Rice argues that differential prices may also be impeded by price discrimination laws. See
id. at 5 n.8.
145. But see Kitch, Regulation, the American Common Market and Public Choice, 6 HARv. J.L.
& PuB. POL'Y 119, 125 (1982) (suggesting a market-oriented approach to provide differential prod-
uct liability protection).
146. Policies of a state that generate externalities will not inevitably result in allocative ineffi-
ciency. If legal entitlements are clear and transaction costs are minimal, the state that bears the
1991] 1289
HeinOnline  -- 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1289 1990-1991
SOUTHERN CALIFORNLI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1261
particular state affects residents of other states. Residents of the state
that is the source of the pollutants might not wish to enact strict anti-
pollution standards because they have a high tolerance for pollutants, the
topographical structure of their state shields them from adverse effects,
their political culture eschews an activist public sector, 47 or they fear the
loss of business attributable to increased regulation. Regardless of the
reasons behind their inaction, a substantial risk exists that entrusting
environmental decisionmaking authority to state legislatures will lead to
too little regulation since the residents of the state do not bear the full
costs of their actions.
Suboptimal regulation may also be attributable to the well-known
problem of the prisoner's dilemma.14 A prisoner's dilemma describes
situations in which all parties could be made better off if they cooperated
with each other, but cooperation is unlikely to occur because of high
transaction costs, insufficient information, or strong incentives to
defect. 49 The problems involved in the prisoner's dilemma affect many
types of state regulation. For example, a state may hesitate to regulate
air pollution because its citizens would bear the full costs of the regula-
tion, but would not receive the full benefit. In essence, anti-pollution
regulation may be a public good that states underproduce because citi-
zens in other states can free-ride on the benefits. Transaction costs and
strategic bargaining may limit the ability of states to agree on ways to
share the cost of regulation. Assuming that the aggregate benefits of pol-
lution control are less than the costs, achieving an efficient level of pollu-
tion control may be impossible without the intervention of the federal
government. 50
Even in the absence of public goods problems, competition among
states for business capital may lead to inefficient levels of state
externalized cost can bargain with the state generating the externality to stop the externality-promot-
ing policy or activity. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 15-16 (1960).
However, unclear legal entitlements, high transaction costs, and strategic bargaining may make such
agreements difficult or impossible to reach and enforce. See Inman & Rubinfeld, A Federalist Fiscal
Constitution for an Imperfect World. Lessons from the United States, in FEDERALISM: STUDIES IN
HISTORY, LAW, AND POLICY: PAPERS FROM THE SECOND BERKELEY SEMINAR ON FEDERALISM
79, 86-87 (H. Scheiber ed. 1988).
147. See infra text accompanying notes 194-201.
148. Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, Federalism and Regulation, in THE REAGAN REGULATORY
STRATEGY 111, 117 (G. Fads & M. Fix eds. 1984).
149. See Inman, Markets. GovernmentM and the "New" Political Economy, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 647, 663-72 (A. Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds. 1987).
150. See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 146, at 87-88 (Federal intervention may be necessary to
remedy failed Coasian bargains among jurisdictions.).
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regulation.151 For example, if a state were to enact a worker safety law
that added to the cost of products manufactured in the state, manufac-
turers might have an incentive to locate in or relocate to states with less
stringent health and safety laws.152 To avoid being placed at a competi-
tive disadvantage, each state might forego efficient regulation. 153 Again,
if the benefits of regulations such as worker safety laws exceed their
costs, the problem of the prisoner's dilemma may make state decision-
making authority undesirable on efficiency grounds."
However, interstate spillovers and competition do not justify federal
preemption of state mortgage foreclosure laws. 55 First, the total costs
151. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663,
666 (1974) (State corporate law leads to a "race for the bottom."). But see Romano, Law as a
Product" Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 279-81 (1985) (Empiri-
cal evidence shows that reincorporations in Delaware are not related to negative shareholder
returns.); Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL
STuD. 251, 256 (1977) (State regulation will lead to laws favorable to stockholders.).
152. Whether firms would have an incentive to relocate depends upon who bears the costs of the
regulation. If competition from producers not subject to worker safety regulations requires the man-
ufacturer to bear the cost, it would have an incentive to leave the state provided that the cost
imposed by the regulation exceeded the cost of relocation. However, it is possible that a manufac-
turer might be able to pass the cost of the regulation back to its sources of inputs, thereby diminish-
ing any incentive to relocate. For example, the employees of a manufacturer might be willing to
accept lower wages in return for a safer working environment. Cf. E. REHEINDER & R. STEwART,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PoLucY 4 n.1 (1985) (In theory, workers in states with stringent
environmental protection laws might accept lower wages in return for environmental benefits.).
153. Cf. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrfice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implemen-
tation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE LJ. 1196, 1211-12 (1977) (Collective action
problems may lead states to adopt lower environmental standards than they would otherwise
prefer.).
154. States are also likely to be inappropriate jurisdictions to enact redistributive programs. See
W. OATEs, supra note 140, at 6-8 (Redistribution at the local level will cause an influx of low income
households and an exodus of high income households.); Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism
and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 451 (1990) (State redistribution is limited by the ability
of industries and affluent residents to migrate.); Peterson & Rom, American Federalism, Welfare
Policy, and Residential Choices, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 711, 725 (1989) (Data support the hypothe-
sis that if redistribution policies are set by state and local government, the aggregate level of redistri-
bution will be less than if the policies had been set at the national level.); Rose-Ackerman,
Cooperative Federalism and Co-optation, 92 YALE LJ. 1344, 1345 (1983) ('[S]tate and local govern-
ments are poor instruments of redistributive policy.").
155. Federal preemption of state usury laws and restrictions on due-on-sale clauses might, how-
ever, be justified by spillover concerns. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, as interest rates for
home mortgage loans exceeded 16 percent, many state usury laws set interest rate ceilings below the
market rate causing lenders to refrain from making loans in those states. See Crafton, An Empirical
Test of the Effect of Usury Laws, 23 J.L. & ECON. 135, 140 (1980) (Usury laws lead to a decrease in
mortgage loan origination.); Nathan, Economic Analysis of Usury Laws, 10 . BANK REs. 200, 204
(1980) ("[R]esearch indicates that usury restrictions have limited the flow of credit to mortgage
markets."); Ostas, Effects of Usury Ceilings in the Mortgage Market, 21 J. FIN. 821, 831 (1976)
(Usury laws reduced mortgage loan volume.). The issuance of mortgage-backed securities is pre-
mised on the geographic diversification of loans in the mortgage pools on which the securities are
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generated by state mortgage foreclosure laws are likely to be modest in
size thereby limiting the potential size of any externality.156 In a recent
article, I used net present value simulation and multiple regression analy-
ses to estimate the magnitude of costs generated by state mortgagor pro-
tection laws.157 I found that the costs attributable to these laws are quite
modest, at least when compared to the estimates offered by other
researchers.15 Nevertheless, given the present structure of the mortgage
market, possible inefficiencies associated with externalities may be pres-
ent. Federally related secondary mortgage market agencies such as
FNMA, GNMA and FHLMC do not price mortgage loans differentially
to reflect the expected costs attributable to state mortgage laws. 159 Since
a large proportion of loans are sold in the secondary mortgage market,
based. See supra text accompanying note 38. The reduction or cessation of home lending attributa-
ble to usury laws threatened the securitization process and therefore created an externality for bor-
rowers and investors in other states. Similarly, federal preemption of state restrictions on the
enforceability of due-on-sale clauses is also partially justified by the fact that these laws generated
large costs for people outside the states that enacted them. State legislation and judicial decisions
that retrospectively refused to enforce due-on-sale clauses effected an enormous wealth transfer from
investors in mortgages to borrowers with existing home loans. In many cases, the investor was
located in a state other than the one that enacted the due-on-sale restrictions. Furthermore, studies
demonstrated that restrictions on the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses eroded the net worth of an
already unstable thrift industry. See FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BD. TASK FORCE ON DUE-ON-
SALE, FINAL REPORT AND TECHNIcAL PAPERS OF THE TASK FORCE ON DUE-ON-SALE 2 (1982)
(In 1981, 40% of the losses incurred by state chartered savings and loan institutions in California
were attributable to due-on-sale clause restrictions.); Dale-Johnson, Dietrich, & Langetieg, A Legal
and Economic Analysis of the Due-on-Sale Clause.'A Retrospective Examination, 10 REs. L. & ECON.
105, 116 (1987) (estimating that due-on-sale restrictions led to the loss of about 45% of California
savings and loan institutions' net worth). If the institutions were to become insolvent, as many have
in the 1980s, taxpayers throughout the nation would be called upon to pay their liabilities. See
Rosenbaum, Southwest to Get Economic Benefits in Savings Bailout, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1990, at
A-I, col. 6 (describing the transfer of wealth from the Northeast and the Midwest to the Southwest
to deal with insolvent savings and loan institutions). Even more directly than usury laws, state laws
retrospectively limiting the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses generated externalities that might
have justified federal preemption.
156. Of course, even if the aggregate costs of mortgagor protection laws were substantial, effi-
ciency concerns would not provide a strong justification for federal preemption as long as the costs of
the laws were fully internalized. If the costs of mortgagor protection laws are externalized, however,
their relatively small magnitude indicates that the potential size of the externality is quite limited.
157. In particular, I examined statutory rights of redemption and state prohibitions on defi-
ciency judgments. See Schill, supra note 75, at 500-15.
158. I estimated that an eleven-month statutory right of redemption would increase the interest
rate charged by lenders for new home mortgage loans by 7.3 basis points. My research also indicates
that prohibitions on deficiency judgments are not significantly related at the 90% confidence level to
increased home mortgage loan rates. See id. at 512-14.
159. Interview with Robert Van Order, Chief Economist, FHLMC (January 1990); cf. Stein-
bach, The Local Nature of Housing, MORTGAGE BANKING, June 1990, at 61, 63 (criticizing FNMA
and FHLMC for employing national underwriting guidelines). For a description of the way
FHMLC prices mortgages, see FHLMC, 1 SELLER & SERVICERS GUIDE 31-33 (1984). The failure
to price loans to reflect state mortgage laws is likely to be attributable to one of two explanations.
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mortgage originators typically do not include the full expected cost of
differential mortgage laws in the interest rates charged to customers.
Therefore, in a manner similar to the product liability example discussed
above, some of the costs of state mortgage foreclosure laws are likely to
be borne by out-of-state investors in mortgage loans and mortgage-
backed securities.
Unlike the case of product liability, however, it should be relatively
simple and economical to internalize fully any significant externalities
created by state mortgage law. Instead of preempting state law, Con-
gress need only require FNMA, GNMA and FHLMC to adjust the price
they pay for loans to reflect the expected cost of state real estate finance
laws. 6° Given the elaborate pricing models already used to evaluate real
estate investments, 161 such an adjustment factor for state laws is unlikely
to add significantly to transaction costs.
162
Differential pricing of mortgages to reflect varying state laws would
not encounter the problems that impede pricing personal property to
reflect diverse product liability laws.163 The legal protections are tied to
property that, by definition, cannot be moved from one state to another.
Therefore, mortgagors purchasing property in one state would be unable
to obtain the benefits of another state's laws.
64
When analyzing the effects of interstate spillovers and competition
on economic efficiency, one should not conclude that the interstate effects
First, as my empirical analyses suggest, these laws are likely to generate only modest costs. There-
fore, the benefits of pricing the expected costs of the laws may be less than the costs. Second, as
federal agencies or agencies with a relationship to the federal government, FNMA, GNMA, and
FHLMC may fear that "discriminating" against the laws of particular states will create political
problems in Congress.
160. Differential pricing of mortgage loans to reflect the cost of state laws might indirectly pro-
mote uniform real estate finance law. Once the externality created by the secondary mortgage mar-
ket is internalized, states with exceptionally protective laws might decide that the costs of the laws
outweigh their benefits. Uniform real estate finance law, voluntarily adopted by states, would be
unobjectionable from the standpoint of economic efficiency.
161. For a summary of mortgage pricing models, see Hendershott, Mortgage Pricing: What
Have We Learned So Far?, 14 AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. A.T. 497 (1986).
162. See infra text accompanying note 183 (discussing the widespread dissemination of informa-
tion about state mortgage laws).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 143-45.
164. Some commentators have speculated that in the future mortgages might be transferrable
from property to property as a household moves. See The Portable Mortgage, BANKERS RES., Oct.
5, 1987 at 2 (A new loan product offered by Chase Home Mortgage permits a mortgagor to transfer
the balance of the mortgagor's loan to new homes in Chase's market area.). If interstate transfers of
mortgage liens become prevalent, a prospect that is unlikely considering the different legal formali-
ties among states, then mortgagors could pay less than the full costs generated by the laws of the
state in which their property was located.
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of state regulation always impede economic efficiency. On the contrary,
some commentators have hypothesized that competition among jurisdic-
tions can promote, rather than detract from, the objective of economic
efficiency. As Tiebout observed, the ability of people to move to different
jurisdictions creates a market for public goods. 165 The existence of
decentralized decisionmaking at the state or local level permits individu-
als to "vote with their feet," selecting a package of taxes, services, and
regulation that is more likely to reflect their preferences than any prob-
able combination offered by the national government. 166
Tiebout's model was initially designed to explore the efficiency-
enhancing aspects of a system of local governments. Several commenta-
tors, however, have incorporated Tiebout's insights to develop a norma-
tive theory favoring state over federal regulation.16 According to
Easterbrook, "Competition among the states to create attractive systems
of economic regulation is greatest if states may adopt any regulations
they choose . . . so long as the residents of the state that adopts the
regulation also bear the whole monopoly overcharge." 161 In effect, these
commentators argue that state competition leads to more efficient results
than a federal monopoly over regulation. 69
Just as proponents of uniform national law must be careful not to
overstate the negative effects of interstate spillovers and competition,
proponents of state decisionmaking authority should recognize the lim-
ited role that interstate competition for households and firms is likely to
play in promoting economic efficiency.1"' The ability of households and
firms to move to jurisdictions offering desirable packages of taxes, serv-
ices, and regulations drives Tiebout's model. The model assumes perfect
information, costless mobility, a large number of different communities
165. See Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. PoL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956).
166. See id. at 418, 420. For a critique of the normative underpinnings of the Tiebout model,
see Briffault, supra note 154, at 417-25.
167. See, eg., T. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS 1-33
(1990) (discussing the advantages generated by interstate competition); Kitch, Regulation and the
American Common Market in REGULATION, FEDERALISM AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 9, 13 (A.
Tarlock ed. 1981) (Decentralized authority places strong incentives on jurisdictions to promulgate
efficient rules.).
168. Easterbrook, supra note 140, at 45 (emphasis in original).
169. See T. DYE, supra note 167, at 1-33; Kitch, supra note 167, at 9, 13.
170. Indeed, Easterbrook seems sensitive to this qualification. See Easterbrook, supra note 140,
at 44 ("A few pieces of (solid) evidence suggest that people sort themselves out by moving to particu.
lar jurisdictions-much more so within states, where there are thousands of competing jurisdictions,
than among states.")
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to choose from, and the absence of external effects.171 Although the evi-
dence is by no means uncontradicted, several empirical studies of intra-
metropolitan mobility have shown that people do behave in a manner
consistent with Tiebout's model.172 Nevertheless, the failure of econo-
mists to demonstrate consistently the empirical validity of Tiebout's
model at the local level should make one particularly careful about
claiming its efficacy at the state level, especially for individual house-
holds. Except for people living near state borders, the cost of relocating
from one state to another due to dissatisfaction with a particular set of
public policies may be prohibitive. Not only must one gather informa-
tion about the range of taxes, services, and regulation offered by compet-
ing jurisdictions, but one would frequently have to sell one's house and
obtain new employment. 173
171. See Tiebout, supra note 165, at 419.
172. See Cebula, An Analysis of Migration Patterns and Local Government Policy Toward Public
Education in the United States, 32 PUB. CHOICE 113, 119-20 (1977) (Expenditures on education and
levels of property taxation affect migration to localities.); Gramlich & Rubinfeld, Micro Estimates of
Public Spending Demand Functions and Tests of the Tiebout and Median-Voter Hypotheses, 90 J.
POL. ECON. 536, 558 (1982) (Michigan data indicate that variations in expenditure residuals are
smaller for urban communities than for the entire sample; actual spending conforms to desired levels
in Tiebout-like communities.); Hamilton, Mills & Puryear, The Tiebout Hypothesis and Residential
Income Segregation, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS: THE ECONOMIC ISSUES 101,
112 (E. Mills & W. Oates eds. 1975) (The number of school districts in a metropolitan area signifi-
cantly influences the degree of suburban income segregation.); Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes
and Local Public Spending on Property Values An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the
Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. POL. ECON. 957, 968 (1969) (New Jersey data show that local property
values are negatively related to the effective tax rate and positively related to per pupil school
expenditures.). But see Lowery & Lyons, The Impact of Jurisdictional Boundarie An Individual-
Level Test of the Tiebout Model, 51 J. POL. 73, 91-93 (1989) (A comparison of a jurisdictionally
fragmented metropolitan area to a consolidated metropolitan area indicates that patterns of dissatis-
faction with local services are unrelated to institutional relationships, and in fragmented jurisdictions
few citizens intended to opt for exit option.); Pack & Pack, Metropolitan Fragmentation and Local
Public Expenditures, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 349, 358-59 (1978) (A considerable disagreement exists
within Philadelphia suburbs with respect to demand for public goods and services.); Pack & Pack,
Metropolitan Fragmentation and Suburban Homogeneity, 14 UrB. STUD. 191, 199 (1977) (Income
homogeneity in Pennsylvania localities is quite limited, which suggests that substantial variation in
demand for public goods existed.); Rose-Ackerman, Tiebout Models and the Competitive Ideak An
Essay on the Political Economy of Local Government, in 1 PERSPECrIVES ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 23 (1983) (criticizing and evaluating empirical research on the Tie-
bout model).
173. Very few studies test whether the Tiebout model accurately predicts interstate mobility.
Researchers have examined whether people move to individual states in response to different tax
policies and different levels of social welfare benefits. One empirical study shows that a relatively
progressive tax system and high levels of transfer spending tends to reduce the net migration of
whites into a state. See Althaus & Schachter, Interstate Migration and the New Federalism, 64 Soc.
Sm. Q. 35, 40 (1983). Empirical studies also show that poor people tend to move to states that offer
comparatively high welfare benefits. See Cebula & Koch, Welfare Policies and Migration of the Poor
in the United Stater An Empirical Note, 61 PuB. CHOICE 171, 175 (1985); Peterson & Rom, supra
note 154, at 725. Another empirical study demonstrates that whites who move between states do not
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Nevertheless, at the margin, state lawmaking authority is likely to
provide some discipline that would be absent if the federal government
were the only decisionmaker. 174 Although one might not be willing to
move to another state solely because of its real estate finance laws, polit-
ical culture studies indicate that states' policies differ from each other in
predictable and consistent patterns.17 Therefore, one might have a suffi-
cient incentive to move to a competing state for a bundle of services,
taxes, and regulations that accord with one's preferences, even f one
would not have moved for any one element of the package. 176
2. Economies of Scale and Transaction Costs
Varying state laws might also lead to inefficiency if they result in
reduced economies of scale of production or generate substantial transac-
tion costs. The effect of state law on economies of scale of production is
particularly apparent in the field of product safety regulation. 177 States
frequently enact product safety laws that vary greatly and are sometimes
inconsistent with each other. Thus, manufacturers who wish to sell their
products in all fifty states may have to produce goods that are custom-
ized for particular states' product safety laws. If the industry is one with
a declining average cost function, producing different goods for different
states might generate lost scale economies. 178 Preserving scale economies
may, in some areas of commercial law, justify replacing divergent state
laws with a uniform national standard.1 79
tend to move to states with high welfare benefits and high levels of property taxes, whereas African-
Americans tend to move to states with high welfare benefits. See Cebula, Interstate Migration and
the Tiebout Hypothesi" An Analysis According to Race Sex, and Age, 69 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 876,
878 (1974).
174. See Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 148, at 121.
175. See infra text accompanying notes 194-201.
176. In addition, even if interstate mobility were extremely limited, the existence of different
packages of taxes, services, and regulation may permit residents to observe alternative state policies
and pressure their own state to adopt them. See R. HOLCOMBE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
DEMOCRACY 174 (1985).
177. See T. BOURGOIGNiE & D. TRUBEK, CONSUMER LAW, COMMON MARKETS AND FEDER-
ALISM IN EUROPE AND THE UNrrED STATES 41 (1987) (arguing that state consumer product laws
might lead to lost scale economies).
178. See id.; cf. Wolman, Decentralization: What It Is and Why We Should Care, in DECEN-
TRALIZATION, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND MARKETS: TOWARDS A POST-WELFARE AGENDA 29,
31 (R. Bennett, ed. 1990) ("[D]ecentralization to large numbers of small units may inhibit achieve-
ment of optimal levels of efficiency by not permitting economies of scale in some service provision.").
179. See Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 148, at 118 ("Uniform national regulation fre-
quently produces economies of scale for private firms in interstate commerce. Search costs are
reduced; economies of national scale in production and distribution arrangements are maintained.").
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The adoption of uniform national law has also been proposed to
reduce transaction costs. Commentators have argued that different state
laws require parties to commercial transactions to spend large sums of
money complying with a wide variety of legal formalities. In particular,
companies that transact business in more than one state are required to
expend resources gathering information about the laws of each state and
assessing their impact on the proposed transaction.180 Indeed, in their
Prefatory Note to the Uniform Land Transactions Act, the Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws expressed the view that uniform state real
estate finance laws would "encourage widespread lending by financial
entities which presently may restrict their lending to a few states because
of the difficulties and additional expense involved in dealing in other
states with widely varying laws." ''
Diverse state real estate finance laws are likely to have a minimal
effect on economies of scale for thrifts and other financial institutions.
The practice of originating mortgage loans is unlikely ever to reach the
level of centralization and mass production achieved for many types of
consumer credit. Data collected by the mortgage banking industry indi-
cate that economies of scale are quickly exhausted with respect to mort-
gage loan origination.'82 Due to the large size of the loan and the
importance to the lender of the property securing the loan, lenders must
evaluate carefully the economic risks of local real estate markets and
appraise the value of each unique piece of real property securing every
180. See Davis, Revamping Consumer-Credit Contract Law, 68 VA. L. REv. 1333, 1341 (1982)
(Multistate consumer lenders must keep up with state laws.); Phillips, Secured Credit and Bank-
ruptcy: A Callfor the Federalization of Personal Property Security Law, 50 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
53, 65 (1987) (Substantial costs of legal research are attributable to state law.).
181. ULTA, Prefatory Note, 13 U.L.A. 469, 470 (1986).
182. See MORTGAGE BANKERS Ass'N OF AM., 2 TOWARD THE YEAR Two THOUSAND: REAL
ESTATE FINANCE IN THE DECADE AHEAD-RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FINANCE IN THE DECADE
AHEAD 9-10 (1989) ("[Tlhe 1987 cost survey supports the contention that there are few economies
of scale that can be realized in the retail production area... L] loan origination is very much a local
business."); Lasko, Introduction, in MORTGAGE BANKING: A HANDBOOK OF STRATEGIES, TRENDS
AND OPPORTUNITIES 1, 11 (J. Lederman ed. 1989) ("In the loan production area, available data
suggest that economies of scale are exhausted at a fairly low volume .... ); Mara, The New Econom-
ics of Mortgaging, MORTGAGE BANKING, Mar. 1989, at 89, 94 ("Smaller firms can also originate
profitably. They are better able to understand their local market."). Mortgage servicing, however,
does seem to demonstrate significant economies of scale and has undergone significant consolidation.
See Lott, Strategic Overview of Mortgage Banking, in MORTGAGE BANKING: A HANDBOOK OF
STRATEGIES, TRENDS AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra, at 19, 26 ("In contrast to loan production, loan
servicing operations are subject to economies of scale."); Cholewicki, Economies of Scale and Profit-
ability, MORTGAGE BANKING, Mar. 1989, at 69 (economies of scale exist for servicing portfolios of
up to 80,000 loans). But cf. Follain & Zorn, The Unbundling of Residential Mortgage Finance, 1 J.
HOUSING RES. 63, 80 (1990) (arguing that no econometric study confirms economies of scale for
mortgage servicing).
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loan. Furthermore, unless the nation were to adopt a national system of
land title registration, local counsel and title specialists would still be
required. Although many mortgage originators operate in more than one
state, many aspects of the mortgage origination process will likely remain
localized.
Even if the process of loan origination were to become centralized,
diverse state laws would not significantly impair the achievement of scale
economies. The essential product, the home mortgage loan, would
remain the same in every state. Although different legal documents
would be required for each state, present use by secondary mortgage
market agencies of state-specific loan forms indicates that the additional
costs of customized documentation would be minimal.
The localized nature of much of the real estate loan origination pro-
cess may also help to minimize the transaction costs of diverse state real
estate finance laws. Since much of the origination process involves intra-
state actors such as mortgage bankers, appraisers, and attorneys to
render title opinions, incentives exist for these parties to develop knowl-
edge and expertise regarding local economic conditions and state laws.
Given the probability that many aspects of the loan origination process
will remain local in nature, the existence of "local" law is unlikely to
inhibit residential lending or increase transaction costs as much as it
would for other types of multistate commercial transactions that can
achieve a higher level of centralization.
Transaction costs attributable to diverse state real estate finance
laws may be of more consequence in the secondary mortgage market.
Out-of-state purchasers of mortgage loans may lack the incentive of local
mortgage originators to acquire detailed knowledge of each state's mort-
gage law. Nevertheless, centralized sources of information about state
mortgage law help minimize transaction costs. Several law firms across
the nation specialize in mortgage foreclosures and have experience in all
fifty states. In addition, detailed summaries and comparisons of state
real estate finance laws are widely available.' 83
Another source of transaction cost that figures prominently in other
areas of state commercial law should be of relatively little consequence in
real estate finance transactions. Commentators have observed that trans-
action costs attributable to divergent state laws are greatest in multistate
transactions where legal issues involve complex choice of law questions.
183. See, eg., D. JANKowsKI, THE NATIONAL MORTGAGE SERVICER'S REFERENCE DiREC-
TORY (6th ed. 1989); M. SHERMAN, MORTGAGE AND REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT GUIDE (1988).
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The resolution of conflict of law issues frequently requires significant
expenditures of legal resources, and the uncertainty generated by this
complex body of law may increase the risk of interstate transactions."'
Choice of law questions for real estate finance transactions, however, are
among the most simple. In most cases, the state law to be applied is the
law of the state in which the real property is located.1 85
In summary, economic efficiency will not be significantly enhanced
if Congress or the states adopt a uniform national real estate finance law.
Current differences in state laws governing real estate finance do not gen-
erate significant externalities and have not led to a destructive regulatory
"race to the bottom" to attract capital. Those externalities now gener-
ated by the failure of secondary mortgage market agencies to price loans
to reflect the costs imposed by differing state laws could easily be inter-
nalized by the adoption of a differential pricing policy. Varying mort-
gage laws are also unlikely to lead to a reduction in economies of scale,
although they may generate transaction costs in the secondary mortgage
market. These transaction costs, however, are likely to be comparatively
modest due to the existence of centralized sources of information.
Entrusting mortgage law to the states may even promote economic effi-
ciency, at least at the margin, by establishing some market discipline over
the regulatory process.
B. "ONE NATION..."
Admittedly, diverse state mortgage laws are likely to generate mod-
est transaction costs. 186 If the existence of state lawmaking authority
over residential real estate finance generated no benefits, it would be diffi-
cult to argue against federal preemption. Nevertheless, allowing each
state to develop its own mortgage laws is preferable under the utilitarian
principle that government actions should satisfy the greatest possible
number of individual preferences. As long as tastes for various forms of
government intervention can be expected to vary across states or regions
184. Day, The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 8 U. FLA. L.
Rnv. 276 (1955) (The need for uniformity is greatest when the steps required to complete transac-
tions take place in more than one state, necessitating the consideration of different laws or raising
difficult questions of conflict of law.); cf. Burbank, supra note 96, at 767-68 (The costs of uncertainty,
including those resulting from choice of law questions, support uniform federal preclusion laws.).
185. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 229 (1971) ('The method for the
foreclosure of a mortgage on land and the interests in the land resulting from the foreclosure are
determined by the local law of the situs.").
186. See supra text accompanying note 183.
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and government actions do not generate significant spillover effects,187
decentralized lawmaking will maximize utility. In particular, if the
responsibility for policy generation and legal rulemaking is located at the
state level, citizens who constitute a majority at the state level but are in
the minority at the national level will be able to satisfy their preferences
at no cost to the rest of the nation.188
Federal preemption of state law, however, has occasionally been jus-
tified on the ground that meaningful differences no longer exist among
the states. A more modest version of this argument does not suggest that
people and economic conditions are homogenous across the nation, but
instead asserts that with respect to the particular subject matter of the
regulation, there are no meaningful differences among states. 189
There is little doubt that with the growth of national commercial
markets, local economies are no longer as distinct as they once were. 90
In addition, given the relatively high level of interregional mobility of
American households and the existence of national television networks,
cultural barriers among regions and states have diminished in impor-
tance throughout the twentieth century.' 9 ' Nevertheless, it would be a
grave error to conflate the trend of increasing national homogeneity with
the conclusion that meaningful differences among states no longer
exist.'92 On the contrary, the economies of states such as Idaho and
187. If a state policy has significant effects on the citizens of other states, however, the utility
maximization objective might support federal preemption. See supra text accompanying notes 140-
54.
188. Cf Tullock, Federalism: Problems of Scale, 6 PUB. CHOICE 19, 22 (1969) ("IThe individ-
ual will suffer less cost from governmental activities of which he disapproves the smaller the govern.
ment."). Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that, at least with respect to most issues of
commercial law, citizens of State A will be indifferent about the laws affecting citizens of State B,
provided that the citizens of State A are not financially disadvantaged by State B's legislation. To
the extent that citizens of State A wish to impose their moral or ethical viewpoint on citizens of State
B, however, state lawmaking may not necessarily maximize aggregate utility. Cf. Wolman, supra
note 178, at 29, 35-36 ("National interests" such as civil rights, adequate education for the future
workforce, and minimum levels of welfare do exist.).
189. Se eg., Davis, supra note 180, at 1349 (arguing in favor of federal preemption of con-
sumer credit law on the ground that the "fundamental relationship between consumer and creditor is
the same everywhere.").
190. But cf. Brace, Isolating the Economies of States, 17 AM. POL. Q. 256, 269 (1989) (data
show that "states became more economically autonomous in the period studied [1968-1985].").
191. But cf. Schill, supra note 137, at 887 (discussing the rise of regionalism in 1970s and
1980s).
192. See Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation:
Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. Rav. 265, 281 (1990) ("The fifty states
that comprise the union differ dramatically in history, demography, economic orientation, and natu-
ral endowment.").
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Wyoming bear very little resemblance to those of New Jersey and Dela-
ware. Some state economies depend upon natural resources, while other
states have employment concentrated in such areas as financial services,
agriculture, and technology. 19 3
Besides economic factors, states continue to vary along racial, reli-
gious, and cultural dimensions. Some states have large numbers of racial
or ethnic minorities, while others are racially or culturally homogenous.
Among states with large minority populations, the ethnic and cultural
composition of the minority population varies dramatically from state to
state. Large Hispanic populations live in California, Florida and the
Southwest, while African-American households make up a significant
proportion of the population in the South and certain northeastern states.
Kansas and Oklahoma remain in the Bible Belt whereas Jews still cluster
in states with large urban populations.
The continued diversity among states along economic, population,
and cultural dimensions has effects that extend beyond the jobs at which
people work, the languages they speak, and the foods they consume.
Political scientists have repeatedly found that differences among states
lead to distinctive political cultures and attitudes that, in turn, affect pub-
lic policy and law. Most research on state political culture can be traced
to the work of Elazar. In 1966, Elazar identified three distinct political
cultures spread by settlers of the United States as they migrated through-
out the nation: the moralistic culture, the traditionalistic culture, and
the individualistic culture. 94 The moralistic culture of many northern
states views politics and government as a positive instrument for promot-
ing social and economic welfare. Typically, moralistic political cultures
favor decentralized, local government intervention over centralized, fed-
eral action. 195 In contrast, the political culture of the traditionalist
193. See Gray, The Socioeconomic and Political Context of States, in PoLmics IN THE AMERI-
CAN STATES 3, 24 (V. Gray, H. Jacob & R. Albritton, eds. 5th ed. 1990) ("mhe states' economies
vary in size, in which economic sector is most important (manufacturing, services, financial, mining,
etc.), and in the major goods produced.").
194. D. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 86-94 (1966).
195. See D. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A ViEw FROM THE STATES 118 & 145 n.10
(3d ed. 1984) (Moralists may oppose federal government programs, but favor identical local initia-
tives.); D. ELAZAR, CITIES OF THE PRAIRIE: THE METROPOLITAN FRONTIER AND AMERICAN
PoLrITcs 263-64 (1970) (Moralists "channel the interest in government intervention into highly
localistic paths so that a willingness to encourage local government intervention to set public stan-
dards does not necessarily reflect a concomitant willingness to allow outside governments equal
opportunity to intervene."); Johnson, Political Culture in American States: Elazar's Formulation
Examined, 3 AM. J. POL. Scl. 491, 505 (1976) (Presenting an empirical study that shows moralism is
negatively related to centralized government decisionmaking and positively related to local
administration.).
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states, many of which are located in the south, typically entails skepti-
cism about both political participation and activism in the public sec-
tor.19 6 Government is viewed as useful in maintaining traditional ways
of life. The political culture of individualist states lies somewhere
between the moralistic and traditionalistic cultures. 197 Political partici-
pation is useful as a means to improve one's social and economic posi-
tion. Limited government intervention is approved of to achieve
utilitarian objectives.
In recent years, political scientists have transformed Elazar's obser-
vations about political culture into verifiable hypotheses. Numerous
empirical studies demonstrate that the political culture of a state is a
reliable predictor of many forms of political participation and policy out-
put.198 For example, Sharkansky developed a scale of political culture
ranging from moralism to traditionalism and found that high traditional-
ism scores were correlated with low voter participation, less developed
government bureaucracies, and reduced levels of taxes, government
expenditures on public services, and public-employee salaries t99
Although commentators differ as to the cause of the relationship between
state political culture and public policy,2 °° virtually all agree that state
public policies differ based upon political culture. 01
196. D. ELAzAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM, supra note 195, at 118-19.
197. See id. at 115-17.
198. See T. ANTON, AMERICAN FEDERALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY 56 (1989) ("[C]areful stu-
dents of state politics, from journalists to systematic empirical researchers, agree that state bounda-
ries continue to define important differences of substance as well as style in American politics.").
199. See Sharkansky, The Utility of Elazar's Political Culture: A Research Note, 2 PoLrrY 66
(1969). Sharkansky found that the effect of political culture on politics and policy existed even when
the researchers controlled for regional and socioeconomic characteristics. Id. at 68-72.
200. Compare Joslyn, Manifestations of Elazar's Political Subcultures. State Public Opinion and
the Content of Political Campaign Advertising, 10 PuBIus: J. FEDERALISM 37, 54-55 (1980) (Varia-
tion in public opinion among states "matches up extremely well" with subcultural patterns observed
by Elazar.) with Lowery & Sigelman, Political Culture and State Public Policy: The Missing Link, 35
W. POL. Q. 376, 381 (1982) ("[The performance of the political culture variables as predictors of
attitudes related to political participation and the desired scope of government activity is modest at
best."). Lowery and Sigelman suggest that public policies may be influenced more by political elites
who adhere to the political culture of their state than by mass public opinion. Id. at 383. Erikson,
McIver, and Wright found that interstate differences in political culture account for more of the
variation in political ideology and partisanship than do demographic variables. Nevertheless, they
were unable to explain what caused the pattern of political culture demonstrated by their study.
Erikson, McIver & Wright, State Political Culture and Public Opinion, 81 AM. POL. SCl. REv. 797,
808 (1987).
201. See, eg., T. ANTON, supra note 198, at 55, 60; J. TREADWAY, PUBLIC POLICYMAXING IN
THE AMERICAN STATES 63 (1985); Lowery, Gray & Hager, Public Opinion and Policy Change in the
American States, 17 AM. POL. Q. 3, 13 (1989).
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Political culture studies show that despite their growing interdepen-
dence, American states retain their importance and vitality as distinctive
forums for policy generation and legal rulemaking.2° In the context of
real estate finance law, states with cultures that favor an activist govern-
ment are more likely to support legal rules that protect mortgagors from
the adverse effects of foreclosure and default.2 °3 In addition, varying
state economies might lead states to adopt different laws to govern the
mortgage foreclosure process. The risk of mortgage default and foreclo-
sure is not uniform throughout the United States.2°4 In states with
undiversified economies °5 or economies subject to unexpected disrup-
tions, 206 homeowners might be especially inclined to demand laws such
202. In addition, empirical studies demonstrate that state policy choices concerning a wide vari-
ety of issues remain varied. See, eg., Kemp, Nationalization of the American State. A Test of the
Thesis, 6 Am. POL. Q. 237, 24142 (1978) (Relative variation in state spending for welfare, education,
highways and health remained stable from 1958-74; absolute variation of expenditures increased.).
See also T. DYE, supra note 167, at 41-42 (Coefficients of variation for revenues and expenditures for
various public goods and services have remained unchanged over the past three decades.); J. WIL-
SON, AMERICAN GovERNmENT 69 (4th ed. 1989) ('There remains more political and policy diver-
sity in the United States than one is likely to find in any other large industrialized nation.").
203. A comparison of Elazar's classification of state political cultures with the states that have
adopted statutory rights of redemption and anti-deficiency judgment legislation demonstrates that
states with predominantly moralistic political cultures have adopted these laws with much greater
frequency than states with individualistic or traditionalistic cultures. Fifty-nine percent of moralistic
states give a home mortgagor a statutory right of redemption when the mortgagee forecloses its
mortgage using the predominant method of foreclosure. Only 35% of individualistic states and 38%
of traditionalistic states provide similar protections. Thirty-five percent percent of moralistic states
prohibit a mortgagee from obtaining a deficiency judgment when it uses the predominant method of
foreclosure to foreclose a home mortgage loan. Only 12% of individualistic states and 6% of tradi-
tionalistic states provide similar protection against deficiency judgments. See D. ELAZAR, AMER-
CAN FEDERALISM, supra note 195, at 136 (classifying state political cultures); Schill, supra note 75,
at 510 (describing the process for identifying states with mortgagor protection laws). A recent
econometric study indicates that moralistic states are more likely to enact consumer protection legis-
lation than states with individualistic or traditionalistic political cultures. See Sigelman & Smith,
Consumer Legislation in the American States: An Attempt at Explanation, 61 Soc. Sci. Q. 58, 66-68
(1980).
204. See Ogden, Rangan & Stanley, Risk Reduction in S&L Mortgage Loan Portfolios Through
Geographic Diversification, 2 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 39, 42 (1989) (Regional variations in economic
conditions lead to a broad range of standard deviations of mortgage foreclosure rates in 12 FHLBB
districts.).
205. See Clauretie, Regional Economic Diversification and Residential Mortgage Default Risk, 3
J. REAL EST. RES. 87, 92 (1988) (State mortgage foreclosure rates are negatively related to increased
levels of economic diversification.); Steinbach, supra note 159, at 64 ('Type of employment and the
degree of economic diversification are extremely important in the overall market evaluation to deter-
mine appropriate underwriting.").
206. Macroeconomic forces are a leading cause of mortgage default and foreclosure. Studies
show that default is significantly related to rising levels of unemployment and falling housing prices.
See Campbell & Dietrich, The Determinants of Default on Insured Conventional Residential Mort-
gage Loans, 38 J. FIN. 1569, 1578 (1983) (showing the relationship between default and unemploy-
ment); Waller, Residential Mortgage Default" A Clarifying Analysis, 7 HousING FIN. REV. 321, 323
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as statutory rights of redemption to enable them to retain their homes
until the economic downturn subsides. 207 As the wave of foreclosures
that hit the Farm Belt and the Southwest in the 1980s demonstrates, real
estate values and mortgage defaults are more closely tied to local than to
national conditions.2 °8 As long as this relationship exists, meaningful
differences among states will continue with respect to the desirability of
various forms of legal intervention to regulate the relationship between
mortgagors and mortgagees.2°
C. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Several commentators have argued for federal preemption of state
commercial law based in part on their belief that federal legislative
(1988) (Residential mortgage default is caused by a decline in property value or by the inability of
the borrower to support mortgage payments.); Holloway & Rosenblatt, Problem Loans: Trends,
Causes and Outlook for the Future 25 (unpublished draft, Apr. 1990) (showing relationship between
unemployment and home prices). Economies subject to unexpected downturns, such as those depen-
dent upon agriculture and natural resources, might have a heightened risk of mortgagor default.
207. Indeed, the correlation between the length of a state's statutory redemption period and the
proportion of its workforce employed in agricultural jobs is .45, which is statistically significant at
the 95% confidence level. Agricultural economies are especially vulnerable to boom and bust cycles
attributable to rising and falling commodity prices. In addition, farmers and their employees are
vulnerable to unexpected droughts and floods. I am not suggesting that states that are especially
prone to unexpected or deep economic downturns would enact laws only during periods of distress.
Instead, citizens of these states are likely to want these laws to remain in effect, in good times as well
as bad, as a form of insurance against the adverse effects of foreclosure. See Schill, supra note 75, at
498-500 (comparing mortgagor protections to insurance); cf. Bauer, Judicial Foreclosure and Statu-
tory Redemption: The Soundness of Iowa's Traditional Preference for Protection over Credit, 71 IoWA
L. REv. 1, 63 (1985) (Since 1860, Iowa's foreclosure law has been less sensitive to economic cycles.).
208. At the same time that foreclosures in farm states and energy-dependent states rose, states
in the Northeast experienced a real estate boom. See Despair, Violence Down on the Farm, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 17, 1983, at 13 (discussing wave of foreclosures in farm states); A
Nationwide Real Estate Crash Is Not in the Cardst But Regional Economic Problems Are a Reality,
SAVINGS INSTITIONS, Oct. 1988, at 41, 43 (comparing soaring house prices in the Northeast to
the housing crash in the Energy Belt). As the 1990s begin, the Northeast housing market is showing
weakness. Schmitt, Collapsing Housing Market Is Taking an Emotional Toll, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13,
1990, at Bl, col. 3 (describing falling house prices and rising foreclosure rates in the New York
metropolitan region).
209. In theory, Congress could take into account the diverse political, cultural, and economic
conditions throughout the nation and enact legal rules to govern the relationship between mortga-
gors and mortgagees that vary among the states. Nevertheless, the considerable costs of collecting
information about preferences and conditions in each of the fifty states as well as the political costs of
enacting these laws would likely make such an approach infeasible. See Krier, Comparative Environ-
mental Policy in Federal Systems (Book Review), 11 HARv. ENvrL. L. REV. 593, 602 n.22 (1987)
('An ideally tailored policy that varies in such a way as to satisfy all the states might be possible in
principle, but ideally tailored policies are costly to develop."); Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, supra
note 148, at 117 ('[D]iversity within wholly federal regulatory programs has proved politically diffi-
cult to achieve in practice.").
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processes are superior to those of states.21 0 State legislatures and law-
making have long been criticized. In the 1960s and early 1970s, states
came under especially harsh attack. Journalists asserted that state legis-
latures were "superfluous," 21' "inefficient and corrupt." '212 Blue ribbon
commissions characterized state governments as "unresponsive and inef-
fective." '213 Even a former governor alleged that governors were weak
and state legislatures ineffective.2 14
Evaluating whether state legislative processes are inferior to those of
the federal government presents daunting methodological problems.
First, such an appraisal presumes the existence of a theory to indicate
which legislative processes are "good" and which are "bad." Thus far,
political scientists have been unable to develop such a theory to guide the
inquiry into comparative legislative competence. However, even if an
underlying normative theory of the legislative process were to gain wide
acceptance, there is a second obstacle to evaluating the comparative com-
petence of state legislatures and Congress: Virtually no empirical studies
exist that systematically compare federal and state legislative processes.
One reason for the absence of comparative research on the legislative
process is the absence of a normative theory of the legislative process. In
addition, it is difficult to make generalizations about state legislative
processes because of the wide diversity of experiences among the fifty
states.
In this section I examine two aspects of state legislative processes:
the institutional capacity of state legislatures and the responsiveness of
state legislatures to constituent opinion. I have selected these two crite-
ria for several reasons. Critiques of state legislators and legislatures are
usually based on allegations that state legislators are unable to engage in
deliberative lawmaking and are unresponsive to their constituents.21 5 In
addition, to the extent that any consensus exists about the most valued
210. See eg., Crandall, It Is Time for a Comprehensive Federal Consumer Credit Code, 58
N.C.L. REv. 1, 51 (1979) ('There is a better balancing of concerns at the federal level."); Davis,
supra note 180, at 1349 ("[S]tate-to-state regulatory variations are fortuitous and arbitrary rather
than responsive to local needs."); Knippenberg & Woodward, supra note 58, at 2526 ("State legisla-
tures have not shown great success in keeping their statutes current.").
211. Jencks, Why Bail Out the States?, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 12, 1964, at 8, 9.
212. F. TRIPPETr, THE STATES: UNITED THEY FELL 3 (1967).
213. COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEv., RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMITTEE, MODERNIZING
STATE GOVERNMENT 15 (1967); see also J. BURNS, CITIZENS CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLA-
TURES, THE SOMETIME GOVERNMENTS: A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE 50 AMERICAN LEGISLA-
TURES viii (2d ed. 1973) (State legislatures are "marked by wholesale corruption at worst and
mediocrity at best.").
214. T. SANFORD, STORM OVER THE STATES 33 (1967).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 213-14.
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attributes of democratic political systems, legislator responsiveness to
constituent opinion is usually mentioned.2 16 Furthermore, the respon-
siveness of legislators to constituent opinion is central to most normative
justifications of state decisionmaking authority. State legislative author-
ity is frequently justified on the ground that citizens in different parts of
the nation will demand varying levels of taxation, services, and regula-
tions because of geographically unique economic and social conditions
and political and cultural beliefs.217 Therefore, if state legislators were
unresponsive to constituent opinion, state legislation would not necessar-
ily be preferable to federal legislation. A final reason for examining legis-
lative capacity and responsiveness is the existence of recent empirical
evidence measuring state performance on these two criteria.
1. Legislative Capacity
Over the past two decades, the institutional capacity of state govern-
ments has increased dramatically. Critics of state governments have fre-
quently argued that lengthy and outmoded state constitutions limit the
ability of governors and state legislators to respond to modem
problems.2"' Since the mid-1960s, however, just under forty states have
adopted new constitutions or have substantially revised existing ones; the
constitutions of many states have been radically shortened and simpli-
fied.2 19 These constitutional revisions removed burdensome limitations
on state officials and increased the capacity of all branches of state gov-
ernment.22° Many states have also increased the length and frequency of
legislative sessions by abolishing constitutional provisions that limited
sessions to short annual meetings or meetings once every two years.221
Gubernatorial terms have been lengthened and limitations on successive
terms have been abolished in many states.222
216. See infra text accompanying notes 230-81.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 186-209.
218. See COMMrrrEE FOR ECONOMIC DEV., supra note 213, at 15; T. SANFORD, supra note
214, at 28.
219. See A. BOWMAN & R. KEARNEY, THE RESURGENCE OF THE STATES 13 (1986).
220. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE QUESTION OF
STATE GOVERNMENT CAPABILrrY 45-49 (1985).
221. See id. at 76-77 (As of 1985, 36 states formally provided for annual legislative sessions);
Reeves, The States as Politier Reformed, Reinvigorated, Resourceful, 509 ANNALS 83, 88 (1990)
(States have adopted annual meetings.).
222. See Beyle, The Governor as Innovator in the Federal System, 18 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM
Summer 1988, at 131, 138 (Since 1955, the number of governors able to serve four year terms
increased from 29 to 47; the number of states that preclude successive gubernatorial terms decreased
from 17 to 3.).
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The institutional resources of legislators have also improved signifi-
cantly in recent years.223 For example, the salaries of state legislators
increased substantially.224 In addition, many legislatures now provide
individual lawmakers with professional staffs to assist them in handling
casework and legislative drafting.225 Finally, research facilities and legis-
lative libraries facilitate the flow of information.226 Similar reforms have
also increased the institutional capacity of governors.22 7
The increased capacity of state legislatures and governors has gener-
ated what one commentator has recently characterized as a "renaissance
of state policy activism. ' , 228  As the federal government cut spending
over the past decade, many states enacted a wide variety of programs to
pick up the slack. State initiatives in health care, economic development,
housing, public assistance, urban redevelopment, and education have
transformed state governments from legislative backwaters into the
"driving force in domestic policy innovation."
229
223. See M. JEWELL & S. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES
274-76 (4th ed. 1986) (discussing professionalization of state legislatures).
224. See Rosenthal, The Legislative Institution: Transformed and at Risk, in THE STATE OF THE
STATES 69, 73-75 (C. Van Horn ed. 1989).
225. See J. HENIG, PuBLiC POLICY AND FEDERALISM 40 (1985).
226. Id. at 40; Reeves, Look Again at State Capacity: The Old Gray Mare Ain't What She Used
to Be, in AMERICAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS TODAY: PERSPECTIVES AND CONTRO-
VERSIES 143, 147 (R. Dilger ed. 1986). Additional reforms that increased state legislative capacity
include the streamlining of committees and the use of computers. See A. BOWMAN & R. KEARNEY,
supra note 219, at 85-86.
227. See generally L. SABATO, GOODBYE TO GOODTIME CHARLIE: THE AMERICAN GOVER-
NORSHIP TRANSFORMED (2d ed. 1983) (describing and analyzing recent changes in the role of state
governors). Although my focus in this part of the Article is on the legislative process, the judicial
branch of state government also plays a role in the creation and interpretation of real estate finance
law. Many of the same trends that increased the institutional capacity of state legislatures and gov-
ernors also improved the capacity of judges. See A. BOWMAN & R KEARNEY, supra note 219, at
97-104; Jacob, Courts, in POLrITCS IN THE AMERICAN STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 222,
226-27 (V. Gray, H. Jacob, & K. Vines eds. 4th ed. 1983); Van Horn, The Quiet Revolution, in THE
STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 224, at 1, 4.
228. Conlan, Politics and Governance: Conflicting Trends in the 1990s?, 509 ANNALS 128, 136
(1990).
229. See Van Horn, supra note 227, at 7; see also T. CNLAN, NEW FEDERALISM: INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL REFORM FROM NIXON TO REAGAN 229 (1988) (discussing policy activism of states);
D. OSBORNE, LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY: A NEW BREED OF GOVERNOR CREATES MODELS
FOR NATIONAL GROWTH (1990) (discussing state economic development, welfare and education
policies); Briffault, supra note 154, at 448 (discussing innovative policies adopted by modernized and
reapportioned state legislatures and governments); Nathan, The Role of States In American Federal-
ism, in THE STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 224, at 15, 18-19 (discussing policy initiatives of
states). With respect to the development of coherent commercial law, state legislators may possess
an advantage over Congress. State legislators have developed a certain level of expertise over the
years concerning the structure of complex commercial transactions. Members of Congress, how-
ever, are frequently thought to lack knowledge about matters of commercial law. See Mooney,
Federalization of the U. C C., in THE EMERGING UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 69, 75 (ALI-ABA,
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2. Legislative Responsiveness
One commentator has suggested that the reforms that have
increased the legislative and administrative capacity of state lawmakers
have also increased their responsiveness to constituent opinion.230 Legis-
lative responsiveness is a concept of ambiguous meaning and normative
content. Responsiveness of legislators to constituents is a central element
in a longstanding debate among political theorists over the meaning of
representative government. Are legislators merely supposed to be agents
of their constituents or are they instead free to ignore popular opinion
and follow their own judgments as to what is in the interest of the people
they represent?231 In a widely cited volume,232 Pitkin addresses some of
the theoretical problems posed by the concept of representation and
rejects both of these extreme alternatives.2 33 Rather than merely reflect-
ing popular opinion accurately, even if such a task were possible, 234 or
acting a manner independent of the views of one's constituents, Pitkin
argues that responsiveness is the key to representation:
[R]epresenting here means acting in the interest of the represented, in a
manner responsive to them.... [D]espite the resulting potential for
conflict between representative and represented about what is to be
done, that conflict must not normally take place. The representative
must act in such a way that there is no conflict, or if it occurs an
explanation is called for. He must not be found persistently at odds
with the wishes of the represented without good reason in terms of
1989) (" he most commonly-expressed skepticism about a federal U.C.C. is the perception that
Congress (including its staff) is woefully ignorant and incompetent in matters of commercial law
and, therefore, is likely to produce 'bad law.' ").
230. See Chubb, Institutions, The Economy, and the Dynamics of State Elections, 82 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 133, 142 (1988). See also infra text accompanying notes 259-60 (discussing effect of
reforms on legislators).
231. See R. PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 323-32 (1979) (discussing delegate
and trustee theories of representation).
232. See H. PrrKiN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
233. Pitkin's work is generally recognized among political scientists as an important contempo-
rary starting point on the theory of representation. See, eg., M. JEWELL, REPRESENTATION IN
STATE LEGISLATURES 10 (1982); Eulau & Karps, The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Compo-
nents of Responsiveness, 2 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 233, 237 (1977).
234. Legislators who view their role as reflecting popular opinion in their districts may encoun-
ter serious obstacles. On many issues, constituents may have no opinions either because they don't
care about the particular matter or because they lack sufficient information to develop a view. Even
if citizens do have opinions about legislative issues, legislators face a difficult task in accurately
perceiving those opinions. See infra note 263. Furthermore, not all opinions are shared with the
same level of intensity. Should representatives give special weight to the opinions of people who care
deeply about an issue or should they weigh all opinions equally?
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their interest, without a good explanation of why their wishes are not
in accord with their interest.
235
As long as representatives are "potentially responsive" to the wishes of
their constituents, they need not always act according to constituent
desires.2 36 Nevertheless, Pitkin carefully qualifies this statement with the
proviso that representatives' actions should not normally be in conflict
with their constituents' wishes.2 37 Eulau and Karps expand on Pitkin's
definition of representation by examining what it means for legislators to
be responsive to their constituents. They argue that responsiveness is not
limited to "policy responsiveness," that is, the manner in which the rep-
resentative and represented interact with respect to the formation of pub-
lic policy.2 38 Legislators also perform acts unrelated to lawmaking that
provide benefits to members of their districts. For example, "service
responsiveness" involves work by legislators to obtain advantages and
benefits for individual constituents.2 39 "Allocation responsiveness" con-
sists of efforts by legislators to maximize their districts' share of the bene-
fits of state projects and programs.2' Lastly, Eulau and Karps describe
"symbolic responsiveness" as symbolic undertakings by legislators to
mobilize the trust and confidence of their constituents. This may include
expressions of sympathy or congratulations and the introduction of bills
on matters of ideological or symbolic importance. 24'
Although no systematic comparisons of federal and state legislative
responsiveness exist,242 recent changes in state legislative capacity and
composition have dramatically improved state performance on all four of
Eulau's and Karps's criteria.243 Enlarged staffs significantly increase the
235. H. PrrxiN, supra note 232, at 209-10.
236. See id. at 222.
237. See id. at 233 ("It is incompatible with the idea of representation for the government to
frustrate or resist the people's will without good reason, to frustrate or resist it systematically or over
a long period of time.").
238. See Eulau & Karps, supra note 233, at 242.
239. See id. at 243-45.
240. See id. at 245-46.
241. See id. at 246-47.
242. One 1983 study found that the level of congruence between public opinion and policy is
greater for state government than the federal government. The authors, however, attribute this find-
ing to the high salience and visibility of the state policy issues selected for study. See Page & Sha-
piro, Effects of Public Opinion on Policy, 77 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 175, 183 (1983). See also T. DYE,
supra note 167, at 96 ("State and local government is generally more responsive than the federal
government to the fiscal preferences of taxpayers.").
243. High levels of legislator responsiveness are neither the only criteria by which to judge
legislators nor, for that matter, unambiguously positive indicators of legislative performance. Sev-
eral commentators have observed that although members of Congress are responsive on all of
Eulau's & Karps's criteria, Congress as an institution acts irresponsibly. See, ag., M. FiORINA,
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service responsiveness of legislators. Casework and constituency services
are now a much more important part of the legislator's job today than at
any time in the past.2' Allocation responsiveness is also increasingly
evident as legislators vie for committee assignments that will enable them
to obtain benefits for their districts. 5 In addition, if public opinion
surveys are any indication, state legislators are also successful in convinc-
ing the public through symbols and actions of their responsiveness. A
1989 survey of American households shows that when asked which level
of government responds best to their needs, 40% selected local govern-
ment, 21% state governments, and 18% the federal government.24 6 Sim-
ilarly, a 1980 survey indicates that 69% of Americans expressed a "great
deal" or a "fair amount" of confidence in state government as compared
to 61% for the federal government.247
The policy responsiveness of state legislators is particularly impor-
tant in determining whether the states can be relied upon to enact real
estate finance laws that correspond to the needs and desires of their citi-
zens. In their empirical examinations of legislative responsiveness, polit-
ical scientists have usually focused on whether legislators, individually
and as a group, act according to the desires of their constituents.248 Stud-
ies that examine the "congruence" of legislative actions and public opin-
ion capture only some aspects of policy responsiveness. As Pitkin
CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 68, 93 (2d ed. 1989) (Policy respon-
siveness has increased at the same time the ability of members of Congress to enact coherent laws
has declined.); G. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 216-17 (2d ed. 1987)
(discussing the fundamental flaw of congressional representation: "great individual responsiveness,
equally great collective irresponsibility").
244. See M. JEWELL, supra note 233, at 8; Rosenthal, supra note 224, at 82.
245. See Abney & Lauth, Parochialism in the State Appropriations Process, 20 STATE & LOCAL
GOV'T REV. 113, 114 (1988); Rosenthal, supra note 224, at 89; Thompson, Bringing Home the
Bacon: The Politics of Pork Barrel in the North Carolina Legislature, I1 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 91, 93
(1986).
246. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CHANGING PUBLIC
ATrrruDEs ON GOVERNMENTS AND TAXES 4 (1989). The survey, conducted by the Gallup Organ-
ization, also showed that respondents had greater trust and confidence in the federal government
than states when it came to cleaning up air pollution, fighting drugs, and helping the homeless.
Respondents had more confidence in the states than the federal government with respect to manag-
ing urban development, improving schools, and recycling trash. See id. at 9. In addition, 22% of
the citizens polled thought the states needed more power, whereas only 5% felt that the federal
government needed additional authority. Similarly, 61% of the respondents said that the federal
government had too much power while only 9% indicated that states were too powerful. See id. at
6.
247. See Reeves, Public Opinion and Federalism, 1986, PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Summer
1987 at 55, 56.
248. See, eg., Miller & Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 45
(1963); see also infra notes 252-58 and accompanying text (discussing results of various surveys of
state public opinion).
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observed, a legislator may act contrary to the wishes of constituents (at
least occasionally) and still be responsive to them as long as the legislator
acts in their interest. Nevertheless, congruence studies can be used to
measure some aspects of policy responsiveness. 249 Where legislative
actions correspond to constituent demands, a presumption exists that the
legislator or legislature is acting responsively.25 0 In addition, although it
might be only one aspect of Pitkin's concept of representation, congru-
ence between legislative action and public opinion has special normative
significance in a political system that recognizes and respects the primacy
of individual preferences in the development of public policy and law.251
Studies of the policy responsiveness of state legislatures are impeded
by the absence of public opinion data at the state and local level. Never-
theless, two recent empirical studies that utilize different estimates of
state opinion suggest that state legislation is surprisingly responsive to
public opinion. Using the proportion of the 1972 presidential vote gar-
nered by George McGovern as an indicator of liberal state public opin-
ion, Nice examined the relationship between public opinion and several
state policies.252 His regression analysis indicates that state policies in
the fields of education, welfare, and tax effort are "clearly associated"
with varying levels of liberal public opinion.25 3
A 1987 study by Wright, Erikson, and McIver used, as a more relia-
ble indicator of state public opinion, surveys that asked Americans
249. Congruence studies may also be the only feasible method of empirically testing legislative
responsiveness. Commentators have observed that Pitkin's formulation of responsiveness is difficult
to test and may in some respects be tautological. Karps & Eulau, Policy Representation as an
Emergent: Toward a Situational Analysis, in THE POLmcs OF REPRESENTATION: CONTINUITIES
IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 207, 215 (H. Eulau & J. Wahlke eds. 1978).
250. See id. at 215. The absence of a correspondence between public opinion and legislative
action does not, of course, preclude the possibility that legislators or legislatures are acting in a
manner that is responsive to the interests of their constituents. Indeed, it is also possible that legisla-
tors who merely reflect public opinion are not acting in their constituents' best long-term interests.
251. See R. PENNOCK, supra note 231, at 266 (1979) ("Individualism ... comes closest to
embracing the ideal of responsiveness as the sole test of good government, for it insists that the role
of democratic government should be to respond to individual preferences."); cf. Schill, supra note 75,
at 515 n.85 (Prohibitions on consensually agreed upon contract terms narrow freedom of contract
and require special justification.).
252. See Nice, Representation in the States" Policymaking and Ideology, 64 Soc. Sci. Q. 404
(1983).
253. See id. at 409-10. States with higher levels of support for McGovern tended to have higher
public assistance benefits, higher levels of education spending, and greater tax effort. Id. at 406.
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whether they would consider themselves liberal, moderate or conserva-
tive.254 The authors examined the relationship between the level of liber-
alism reflected in the surveys and state policies concerning education,
public assistance, consumer protection, tax progressivity, crime, gam-
bling, and equal rights. The results of the study show that state public
opinion strongly correlates with the liberal or conservative content of
state policies.255 The authors conclude that "[s]tate political structures
appear to do a good job of delivering more liberal policies to more liberal
states and more conservative policies to more conservative states. 256
The results of these studies are corroborated by recent observations of
several political scientists that state governments are quite responsive to
citizen opinion.257
The relatively high level of responsiveness found by political scien-
tists contrasts markedly with the criticism of state legislatures expressed
in the 1960s and early 1970s.258 Several theories might explain the
apparent increase in policy responsiveness. Many of the institutional
reforms of the past two decades have effectively transformed the position
254. See Wright, Erikson & McIver, Public Opinion and Policy Liberalism in the American
States, 31 AM. J. PoL. Sc. 980, 985 (1987).
255. See id. at 996.
256. See id. at 999. See also Erikson, Wright & McIver, Political Parties, Public Opinion, and
State Policy in the United States, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 729, 743 (1989) (State political parties
respond to public opinion and promote policy responsiveness.).
257. Sea eg., T. DYE, supra note 167, at 59 (Data show that 41 states are responsive to
demands for education.); H. INGRAM, N. LANEY & J. MCCAIN, A POLICY APPROACH TO POLIT-
ICAL REPRESENTATION: LEssoNs FROM THE FouR CoRNERs STATES 183 (1980) (Surveys of state
legislators in Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, and Utah show that "state legislators are potentially
responsive to the public on issues within a number of important issue clusters."); Rosenthal, supra
note 224, at 71 ("[L]egislatures generally have fashioned policies that are responsive to their various
publics."); Shapiro & Jacobs, The Relationship Between Public Opinion and Public Policy: A Review,
2 Poi- BEHAV. ANN. 149, 154-56 (1989) (discussing "compelling" conclusions of a study that found
state legislatures responsive).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 211-14. Several empirical studies analyzing data from
the 1960s suggested that state legislators were less responsive than the recent studies discussed supra
text accompanying notes 252-57 indicate. See, eg., Jones, Competitiveness, Role Orientations, and
Legislative Responsiveness, 35 J. POL. 924, 931-933 (1973) (Interviews with Texas state legislators
indicate that the legislators' own attitudes were more important than perceptions of constituent
views in determining voting behavior.); Weber & Shaffer, Public Opinion and American State Policy-
Making, 16 MIDwEsT J. POL. SC!. 683, 699 (1972) (State legislators are more responsive to public
opinion in some public policy areas, such as public accommodations and parochial school aid, than
with respect to right-to-work laws, teacher unionization, and gun control.). But see Adams & Fer-
ber, Measuring Legislator-Constituency Congruence: Liquor, Legislators and Linkage, 42 J. POL. 202,
205 (1980) (presenting a re-examinination of Texas legislators finding high level of congruence on
issue of liquor-by-the-drink).
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of state legislator into a desirable career.259 For obvious reasons, legisla-
tors who wish to remain in office are much more likely to want their
votes on legislative issues to be consistent with the opinions of their con-
stituents.2" Increased responsiveness may also be attributable to the
reapportionment of legislative districts and the enfranchisement of
minorities that is mandated by federal law.261 In addition, reforms that
opened the legislative process to public scrutiny such as "sunshine laws"
may have increased the accountability of state lawmakers.262
259. The increase in the number of state legislators who wish to make their jobs a career is
evident in reduced turnover rates. See M. JEWELL, supra note 233, at 25 ('One of the most signifi-
cant trends in American legislatures is the declining rate of turnover."). Nevertheless, the apparent
adoption by state legislators of careerist roles might be short-lived if states follow California's lead
and adopt term limitations for legislators. On November 6, 1990, California voters adopted Proposi-
tion 140, which limited members of the state assembly to three two-year terms and members of the
senate to two four-year terms. See Mydans, The 1990 Electionr California Politicians Reel After a
Vote Limiting Terms, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1990, at A-26, col. 5. President Bush has voiced his
support for a constitutional amendment limiting the terms of members of Congress. See Oreskes,
Bush Backs Move for Limiting Terms of US. Lawmakers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12,1990, at Al, col. 6.
260. See Chubb, supra note 230, at 142.
261. Reapportionment and the protections afforded by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as redesignated and amended at 42 U.S.C. 1973 (1988)), have
increased the representation of citizens from urban areas as well as the poor and minorities. State
legislatures today mirror the populations of their states more than at any time in the past. The
number of African-American legislators rose from 168 in 1969 to 384 in 1985; the number of women
increased from 305 to 1,067. See A. BoWMAN & R. KERNEY, supra note 219, at 17. As a propor-
tion of their legislature's membership, African-Americans and women are better represented in state
legislatures than in the United States Congress. In 1989, women and African-Americans each con-
stituted 4.6% of the membership of Congress. See UNrrED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STA-
TSTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1990 at 257 (110th ed. 1990). In 1985, women and
African-Americans respectively constituted 14.4% and 5% of all state legislators. See A. BOWMAN
& R. KEARNEY, supra note 219, at 17. State legislatures are also no longer as unresponsive to the
needs of central cities as they once were. In fact, recent studies demonstrate that state intergovern-
mental aid appropriations are quite responsive to the needs of urban areas. See Dye & Hurley, The
Responsiveness of Federal and State Governments to Urban Problems, 40 J. POL. 196, 204 (1978)
(State grants-in-aid are generally more responsive to the needs of cities than grants from the federal
government.); Pelissero, State Aid and City Need" An Examination of Residual State Aid to Large
Cities, 46 J. PoL. 916, 931 (1984) (Residual state aid is "very responsive to some common indicators
of city need."); Pelissero, Welfare and Education Aid to Cities An Analysis of State Responsiveness to
Needs, 66 Soc. ScI. Q. 444, 451 (1985) (From 1962 to 1976, state education funding became more
responsive to the needs of some very large American cities; the responsiveness of welfare aid pro-
grams is more uncertain.). But see Ward, The Measurement of Federal and State Responsiveness to
Urban Problems, 43 J. PoL. 83 (1981) (criticizing the methodology used by Dye & Hurley, supra).
At the same time as state legislatures have become more responsive to urban dwellers, the dispropor-
tionate influence of rural populations over state policy has waned. See Rose-Ackerman & Evenson,
The Political Economy ofAgricultural Research and Extension: Grants, Votes, and Reapportionment,
67 AM. J. AGR. ECON. 1, 8 (1985) (Regression analysis shows that reapportionment reduced farm-
ers' power to affect the level of agricultural spending.).
262. Virtually all the states have adopted sunshine laws to permit public access to legislative
proceedings. In addition, over half of all state legislatures permit television coverage of legislative
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Increased legislative capacity and the rather high level of respon-
siveness of state legislatures weakens one of the major justifications for
preempting state real estate finance law in favor of national law. Unfor-
tunately, no empirical studies compare the capacity and responsiveness
of state legislatures to Congress. Considering the widespread variation
among state legislatures, even after the reforms of the 1970s and 1980s it
is likely that members of Congress have more resources at their disposal
than state legislators. As for responsiveness, the picture is less clear.
Congress is much more closely scrutinized than state legislatures, pri-
marily because of greater media coverage. Increased information about
the activities of members of Congress may facilitate the efforts of constit-
uents to monitor legislators and thereby assure that the legislators are
accountable. On the other hand, legislative responsiveness is also more
likely if legislators can accurately perceive the opinion of their constitu-
ents, and state legislators may have an advantage in this area.263 Studies
have shown that legislators are more apt to perceive opinion correctly if
their districts are homogenous. 264 Due to their smaller size, state legisla-
tive districts are much more likely to be composed of people with similar
cultural backgrounds and economic conditions than are congressional
districts. 265
sessions. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 220, at 250-
55.
263. Empirical studies, however, show that the ability of state legislators and members of Con-
gress to perceive accurately the opinions of their constituents is mixed. See Erikson, Luttbeg &
Holloway, Knowing One's DistricL How Legislators Predict Referendum Voting, 19 AM. J. POL. SC.
231, 237 (1975) (Florida legislators were able to predict accurately their constituents vote on two of
three referenda.); Hedlund & Friesema, Representatives' Perceptions of Constituency Opinion, 34 J.
PoL. 730, 741 (1972) (Iowa legislators' predictions of constituent opinion were relatively accurate on
two of four referenda.); McCrone & Kuldinski, The Delegate Theory of Representation, 23 AM. J.
POL. Scl. 278, 289 (1979) (Data show that California legislators were "reasonably accurate" in their
predictions of constituency opinion.); Miller & Stokes, supra note 248, at 56 (Surveys of members of
Congress and constituents indicate that a typical Representative has "very imperfect information
about the issue preferences of his constituency."); Uslaner & Weber, U.S. State Legislators' Opinions
and Perceptions of Constituency Attitudes, 4 LEGis. STUD. Q. 563 (1979) (State legislators mis-
perceive public opinion.).
264. See R. BINGHAM, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN AN URBAN SOCIETY 144 (1986);
M. JEWELL, supra note 233, at 84; M. JEWELL & B. PATTERSON, supra note 223, at 208-09.
265. See M. JEWELL, supra note 233, at 95 ("[S]tate legislative districts are smaller and more
homogenous [than congressional districts], with fewer conflicting interests."). Two additional fac-
tors may affect the comparative responsiveness of state legislatures and Congress. Many states pro-
vide an additional check against legislators acting contrary to majority public opinion. Over twenty
state constitutions provide for legislative referenda and initiatives. Citizens, dissatisfied with state
actions or inaction, may place matters of public policy on the election ballot, provided a sufficient
number of voters sign petitions. The processes of legislative referenda and initiative do not exist at
the federal level. See Bibby, Cotter, Gibson & Hucksham, Parties in State Politics, in POLITIcs IN
THE AMERICAN STATES, supra note 193, at 59, 61. State legislative responsiveness may be ham-
pered, however, by relatively low levels of voter turnout for legislative elections. D. BERMAN,
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The effect of interest groups on legislative responsiveness is also
unclear. One of the recurrent complaints about state legislatures has
been that special interest groups wield too much influence over the pol-
266cymaking process. Special interest groups may impede the responsive-
ness of legislators to constituent opinion because of collective action
problems. Narrowly focused special interest groups have an advantage
over diffuse majorities in influencing government. 267 Frequently, individ-
ual voters who favor a government policy that would benefit a large
number of citizens lack the incentive to organize and expend the
resources necessary to collect information and lobby public officials.
Typically, the costs associated with organizing large numbers of only
moderately interested voters are enormous. Since benefits cannot be lim-
ited to those who organize, but must instead be shared among a large
number of citizens, each individual voter has an incentive to leave the
expensive and time consuming task of political organization to others
and free ride on their efforts. Small groups of intensely interested citi-
zens, however, have much lower organizational costs and are likely to
have a disproportionate impact on the legislative process. Special inter-
est groups can use this organizational advantage to influence the political
process and increase their wealth at the expense of the majority.
The pedigree for most arguments that special interest groups pose a
greater problem at the state, as opposed to the federal, level is especially
distinguished. In Federalist 10, James Madison argued in favor of a fed-
eral government on the ground that smaller governmental units, such as
states, would be particularly susceptible to influence by factions.268 In
theory, because the federal government is composed of a greater number
STATE AND LOCAL PoLrrIcs 11-12 (2d ed. 1978) (State and local elections have lower turnout than
elections for federal offices.). Low voter turnout may result in the election of legislators who do not
represent the interests of the majority of a state's population.
266. See, eg., D. HERZBERG & J. UNRUH, ESSAYS ON THE STATE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 5
(1970) (The absence of individual participation in political process leads to interest group influence.);
G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 191-92 (1966) (Special interest
groups have filled the vacuum created by the absence of effective two party competition in state
legislatures.); Crandall, supra note 210, at 50-51 (Creditors probably have a better chance to get
what they want at the state level than at the federal level.).
267. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF CoLLEcnvE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS (1965); Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public
Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878, 884-85 (1990).
268. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("Hence, it clearly
appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of
faction... is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it.").
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of interests, it should be better able to withstand interest group pres-
sure.2 69 In addition, because the legislative process is less visible at the
state level and thus less subject to close scrutiny by the public, special
interest groups may have increased opportunities to influence the state
policymaking process.
Special interest groups may, however, enjoy certain advantages at
the federal level.270 One of the reasons interest groups have influence
greater than their numbers is the cost of organizing diffuse majorities.271
Since the costs of organizing diffuse moderately interested majorities is
even greater at the national then at the state level, the special interest
group's organizational advantage is magnified at the federal level.272
Interest groups may also prefer rent seeking at the federal level because
the costs incurred will be more widely dispersed than at the state level,
and therefore more likely to elude public detection.273  Furthermore,
recent state legislative reforms such as open meeting laws, lobbyist regu-
lation, and legislator financial disclosure laws have lowered the protec-
tive veil that interest groups once enjoyed at the state level. 274 At the
same time, commentators have increasingly noted the pervasive influence
of special interest groups on members of Congress.275
269. See id.; D. BERMAN, supra note 265, at 90 (Interest group influence at the national level is
thinned out by the number of groups that must compete for influence.).
270. Empirical studies indicate that "state legislators and members of Congress appear to lean
upon information and take cues for decisions from interest groups in roughly the same measure."
M. JEWELL & S. PATrERSON, supra note 223, at 197.
271. See supra text accompanying note 267.
272. See Elliot, Ackerman & Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution:" The Federaliza-
tion of Environmental Law, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 329 (1985) (It is easier for environmental
groups to organize at the state level.); Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process The Jurisprudence
of Federalism After Garcia, 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 341, 386 (The "federal government may be a more
likely subject of capture by a set of special minoritarian interests, precisely because the majority
interest of the national constituency is so large, diffuse and enormously difficult to organize."); cf.
Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls; An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE LJ. 385, 407
(1977) ("As governmental complexity increases, majority sentiment on any single issue is less likely
to prevail; organized minorities become ever more able to engage in logrolling and to take advantage
of majority disorganization.").
273. See R. HOLCOMBE, supra note 176, at 174.
274. Forty-one states have enacted laws requiring legislators to disclose their finances and avoid
conflicts of interest. In addition, all states have adopted lobbyist registration and disclosure rules.
See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 220, at 109; A. Bow-
MAN & R. KEARNEY, supra note 219, at 89.
275. See M. FIORINA, supra note 243, at 24-29 (discussing the influence of political action com-
mittees ("PACs") on Congress); G. JACOBSON, supra note 243, at 193-96 (discussing the growth of
PACs and their influence on government); Hedlund, Lobbying and Legislative Ethics, in REPRESEN-
TATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: ExPLORING LEGISLATIVE ETHICS 89-107 (B. Jennings & D. Calla-
han eds. 1985) (same). PACs may be better positioned to influence members of Congress than state
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Questions about the comparative strength of interest groups at the
state and federal levels cannot be resolved on the basis of theory.
Instead, interest group influence will vary according to the subject matter
of public regulation and the market structure of the industries
involved.276 Frequently, industries will seek preemptive legislation from
Congress as a way of avoiding more stringent regulation by state legisla-
tures.27 In other cases, special interest groups may be better able to
convince state legislatures to adopt regulatory schemes that benefit the
groups.
Proponents of national real estate finance law face enormous diffi-
culties in justifying the preemption of state law on the ground that state
legislative responsiveness is compromised by the influence of special
interest groups. Proponents of federal preemption are generally moti-
vated by the desire to eliminate laws that protect mortgagors from the
adverse effects of default. To the extent that organized interest groups
would be involved in the issue, they would most likely consist of lending
institutions opposed to state mortgagor protection laws.27 These institu-
tions have formed several sophisticated trade organizations to represent
their interests at both the state and federal levels. Since lending groups
legislators because of the higher cost of running a political campaign for Congress. Since state legis-
lative districts are usually considerably smaller than congressional districts, state legislative candi-
dates can rely on relatively inexpensive face-to-face campaigning to a much greater degree than
congressional candidates. See T. DYE, PoLmcs IN STATES AND COMMUNITIES 141 (6th ed. 1988).
276. See Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 148, at 136 ("The political economy of federal
and state regulation cannot be understood without taking into account the market structure of the
affected industries and the supply and demand conditions in both input and output markets.").
277. See Elliot, Ackerman & Millian, supra note 272, at 330-33 (The threat of strict state regula-
tion led the automobile and soft coal industries to seek federal preemptive legislation.). See also
Macey, supra note 192, at 271-72 ("[O]btaining a federal law will be the strategy of choice for most
interest groups seeking to obtain wealth transfers.").
278. Industry groups for mortgage bankers and lending institutions have supported other efforts
to preempt state laws protective of borrowers. See, eg., Administration's 1973 Housing Proposal s
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
173, 180 (1973) (statement on behalf of Mortgage Bankers Association in support of Federal Mort-
gage Foreclosure Act); Housing and Community Development Legislation-1973, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Housing of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1659,
1663 (1973) (statement on behalf of National Association of Mutual Savings Banks in favor of Fed-
eral Mortgage Foreclosure Act). The advantages of the federal forum have not been lost on the
mortgage banking industry. See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS'N OF AM., supra note 182, at 204
("[S]tate legislators tend to be more consumer-oriented [than congressmen] and less concerned about
the effects their actions may have on the mortgage lending business."). The influence of consumers
at various levels of government may vary depending upon the subject matter of the regulation. Cf.
T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND
CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 28-30, 44 n.23 (1989) (Among the 35 state legislatures that opted
out of the federal bankruptcy provisions concerning exempt property, most permit debtors to retain
fewer assets than they would have been entitled to retain under federal law.).
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have an organizational advantage over borrowers and have been unsuc-
cessful in removing mortgagor protection laws at the state level, there is
no reason to believe that state legislative processes are being unduly influ-
enced by these interest groups.279 To the contrary, the current contro-
versy involving enormous losses to the federal government on account of
the insolvency of much of the savings and loan industry, as well as scan-
dals involving thrift contributions to members of Congress, 80 demon-
strate the influence wielded by proponents of preemption in the federal
legislative process. If fear of interest group influence were to guide the
choice between state and federal real estate finance law, state law might
well be preferable.2"'
279. Empirical evidence of the influence of depository institutions at the state level is contradic-
tory. According to one state-by-state inventory of "significant pressure groups," banks, savings and
loans, and similar financial institutions are a significant force in only sixteen of the fifty states. See S.
MOREHOUSE, STATE PoLITcs, PARTIES AND POLICY 108-12 (1980). Another fifty-state survey
found that bankers' associations were among the most effective interest groups in twenty-eight states.
See Thomas & Hrebenar, Interest Groups in the States in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES, supra
note 193, at 123, 144.
280. See J. MENTZINGER, J. HOWELL & C. O'DAY, IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE: S & L INVEST-
MENTS ON CAPITAL HILL 1 (1990) ("During the 1980's, when savings and loans were engaged in
activities that led to the current $300 billion scandal, S & L interests gave at least $11,669,499 in
campaign contributions to congressional candidates and political party committees."); Rosenbaum,
A Financial Disaster with Many Culprits, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1990, at Al, col. 2 ("As the crisis
developed, Congress seemed to be in the pocket of the savings and loan industry, passing laws the
lobbyists wanted, tying up bills they opposed, and hectoring regulators relentlessly to ease up."). See
also Williams, Regulation and Economic Development, in POLrICs IN THE AMERICAN STATES,
supra note 193, at 479, 504 (State chartered savings and loan institutions shifted to federal charters
to escape state regulators who were perceived as "overly sensitive to the wishes of consumer
groups.").
281. Differences in the relative strength of political parties may also affect the susceptibility of
state and federal legislative processes to interest group influence. Strong party organizations and
interparty competition serve as a counterweight to special interest groups. To be successful, political
parties must reach out to diverse majority interests rather than limit their appeal to narrowly
focussed minority interests. See E. SCHATISCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 188-89 (1967); F.
SORAUF, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 408 (4th ed. 1980); Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political
Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1567, 1604
(1988); Ladd, Party Reform and the Public Interest, in ELECTIONS AMERICAN STYLE 222, 227 (A.
Reichley ed. 1987). In addition to curbing the influence of special interest groups, political parties
may promote policy responsiveness by providing voters with programmatic choices, simplifying and
clarifying policy issues and enfranchising lower income and less educated citizens. See W. CRoTr,
AMERICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE 281 (2d ed. 1984); Fitts, supra, at 1607-1609; Ladd, supra, at 227-
28. On policy responsiveness grounds, one might prefer federal or state lawmaking if the level of
party cohesion and competition were significantly greater at one level than the other. Nevertheless,
the enormous variation in political party interaction in the fifty states renders such a generalization
close to impossible to make. Although commentators have observed increasing levels of minority
party strength in recent years, party competition is almost nonexistent in a substantial number of
states. See T. DYE, supra note 275, at 123 (Parties in one-half of the states have a reasonable chance
of election); M. JEWELL & S. PATTERSON, supra note 223, at 41 (One party dominates 19 states.); J.
TREADWAY, supra note 201, at 27 (One-half of the states are competitive for both political parties.).
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CONCLUSION
Over the past ten years, pressures to make the law of real estate
finance uniform have increased due to the creation of national mortgage
markets. After the experience of the 1970s and 1980s, it is now apparent
that if uniform real estate finance law is to be achieved, it will be a result
of federal preemption. In this Article, I examined potential arguments
for uniformity and preemption with respect to mortgage law and found
each to be unconvincing. Economic efficiency rationales for federal pre-
emption are quite weak. Spillovers attributable to different state mort-
gage laws are small and could be eliminated at modest cost. Transaction
costs and lost scale economies are also likely to be quite small. Further-
more, differences among states justify customized legal rules with respect
to the law governing the relationship between mortgagors and mortga-
gees. Finally, a preference for federal, as opposed to state, law attributa-
ble to doubts about the adequacy of state legislative processes seems
without foundation. Over the past two decades, state legislative capacity
has dramatically increased. State legislatures, for the most part, are
responsive institutions with adequate institutional resources to promul-
gate coherent law.
The debate over state real estate finance law is one component of a
larger set of issues regarding the future of commercial law. The twenti-
eth century witnessed the creation of national markets for most goods
and services. As this progressive integration of the American economy
took place, scholars and policymakers often devalued the virtues of legal
diversity in favor of uniformity. Although in some instances legal uni-
formity was achieved voluntarily, increasingly it is taking place coer-
cively.2 82 In this Article, I argued that we should not automatically link
In many other state legislatures, however, the level of party cohesion and competition exceeds the
levels exhibited in the United States Congress. See T. DYE, supra note 275, at 174-75 (Party voting
in several states may be higher than in Congress.); M. JEWELL & B. PATrERSON, supra note 223, at
224 (Among states with competitive party systems, Congress ranks at or slightly below the average
in terms of party cohesion.); D. PRICE, BRINGING BACK THE PARTIES 82-85 (1984) (Party voting
rates for Congress range between 29% and 53%, whereas rates in states range between 35% and
65%; with respect to the "index of cohesion," almost every state legislature shows greater partisan
unity than Congress.); J. WILSON, supra note 202, at 634 ("[T]he legislatures of many of the bigger,
industrialized, northern states tend to be more partisan, more highly organized, and more tightly led
than Congress, whereas legislatures in small, rural, and southern states tend to be somewhat less
structured than Congress.").
282. A recent study by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations demonstrates
the dramatic increase of federal preemption in recent years. According to the Commission, since the
nation's founding Congress has passed 350 statutes that explicitly preempt state law. Over half of
these acts have been passed since 1970. See Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations,
Federal Preemption of State and Local Authority 2 (unpublished draft 1990). See also C. RErrz,
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the development of national markets to uniform national law. In some
instances, the efficiency gains of uniform law may provide a strong justifi-
cation for sacrificing diversity. In other instances, such as mortgage fore-
closure law, uniformity will generate few benefits.
Diverse state laws often reflect the health of our political system,
rather than its infirmity. Different state laws may demonstrate competi-
tion among jurisdictions for the set of public policies that will best meet
the needs and aspirations of their citizens. Diversity may also reflect the
flexibility and experimentation made possible by decentralized govern-
ment institutions. Perhaps even more importantly, diverse state laws
may demonstrate that states continue to function as meaningful forums
for political participation and action. Under our system of government,
the states serve an important role in checking the power of the national
government and preserving individual liberty. In order to continue to
carry out this function the states must not become irrelevant. Yet irrele-
vance will surely be the result if we automatically equate national mar-
kets with national law.
CONSUMER PRODUCT WARRANTIES UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS 10 (2d ed. 1987) (describ-
ing the trend toward national commercial law).
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